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Abstract
Empirical data suggest that low-income households in the United States are
highly mobile, and often involuntarily so. Recently, eviction from rental housing
has received attention as a key component in explaining this phenomenon.
Evictions are disruptive events that sever the economic and social ties of
already-vulnerable low-income families, and inflict significant moving costs upon
financially-constrained households. Reducing the number of evictions is of interest
to policymakers, given their potential to perpetuate poverty cycles. In this thesis, I
investigate whether minimum wages can reduce eviction rates. I combine
state-level variation in US minimum wages with the Eviction Lab, a novel dataset
containing eviction records from 2000-16 for the entire country at the county level.
In line with current minimum wage literature, I compare estimates using a
traditional two-way fixed eﬀects model with the border-discontinuity approach
pioneered by Arindrajit Dube, which examines only counties on either side of a
state border to control for unobserved spatial heterogeneity. Results indicate that
higher minimum wages are associated with fewer eviction filings, though the eﬀect
is small in magnitude and does not appear to translate into a reduction in
completed evictions. Robustness checks confirm that these estimates reflect
impacts on counties at the lower end of the income distribution. My results also
provide evidence of the importance of adequate controls for spatial heterogeneity,
supporting both the use of geographic time trends and the contiguous county
method.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 2015, the median renter in the lowest income quintile in the US spent 56% of their
income on rent. With less than $500 remaining to cover the month’s other expenses – not
even a third of the Supplementary Poverty Measure threshold – it is no surprise that low-
income renters frequently face eviction due to rent arrears (Desmond, An, Winkler, &
Ferriss, 2013; Larrimore & Schuetz, 2017). While the national foreclosure rate amongst
mortgagors breaching 2% during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) sparked talk of a
“housing crisis” (Guren & McQuade, 2019, p. 22), the eviction rate amongst renters
remained above 3% for most of the 2000s with little attention from policy-makers. As of
2016, it stood at 2.34% (Desmond et al., 2018). This is concerning in light of evidence
of the consequences of housing instability (Vásquez-Vera et al., 2017).
Despite their prevalence, evictions have received little attention in the economics
literature. Pioneering fieldwork by Matthew Desmond (2012) has shown evictions to be
disruptive events that sever low-income renters’ social and economic ties and inflict
sizeable costs upon already financially-strained households. As a result, an initial
eviction can lead to a string of others, and cause a downward spiral in housing
conditions. With the threat of homelessness looming and a now-tarnished rental record
limiting their options, evictees often resort to lower quality properties in worse
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neighbourhoods. Given recent studies highlighting the importance of neighbourhood
quality in determining long-term socio-economic outcomes, particularly for children
(Chetty & Hendren, 2018; Chetty, Hendren, & Katz, 2016), evictions appear to play a
significant role in the “reproduction of urban poverty” (Desmond, 2012, p. 122).
In this thesis, I explore whether minimum wage increases have a palpable impact
on eviction rates. Previous studies have found clear evidence that minimum wages lift
workers’ earnings, but their eﬀect on low-wage employment remains contested. Higher
minimum wages increase incomes at the lower end of the distribution, and significantly
reduce poverty rates, suggesting the earnings eﬀect outweighs any subsequent
disemployment (Cengiz, Dube, Lindner, & Zipperer, 2019; Dube, 2019). Minimum
wage increases may therefore help low-income renters build a financial buﬀer with
which they can weather negative income shocks and avoid entering rent arrears.
To quantify the impact of minimum wage, I use US minimum wage data along with
Princeton University’s recently established Eviction Lab. This new dataset records all
eviction applications and court-ordered evictions at the county level for 2000-16. I
compare estimates from the two dominant methodologies in the minimum wage
literature: the canonical two-way fixed eﬀects approach advocated by David Neumark
(Neumark & Wascher, 1992), amongst others; and the contiguous county approach
brought to significance by Arindrajit Dube (Dube, Lester, & Reich, 2010). I focus on
the role of geographic heterogeneity in eviction and minimum wage trends as a
potential source of bias in estimates.
My results indicate that minimum wage increases reduce the prevalence of eviction
filings in the US. Both methodologies exhibit bias when spatially-disparate time trends
are not accounted for. Notably, the canonical two-way fixed eﬀect model fails to detect
any significant eﬀects of higher wages, even after accounting for diﬀerences in geographic
trends, suggesting it does not adequately control for spatial heterogeneity. In contrast,
the contiguous county model suggests a 1% increase in state minimum wages decreases
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county eviction filings by 0.268%, though the estimate becomes insignificant once finer
geographic time trends are incorporated. As counties with small population may drive
variation in the data, I re-estimate my contiguous county model using population sizes
as analytic weights. Results from my preferred specification show that higher minimum
wages decrease eviction filings by 0.292%, and reduce eviction filings as a percentage of
renter households by 0.0124 percentage points.
To verify the robustness of these results, I test the parallel trends assumption for
treated and control counties. In the two-way fixed eﬀect model, there is evidence of
decreasing eviction rates up to four years prior to a minimum wage increase, which
suggests it does not adequately control for spatial heterogeneity in the sample. In
contrast, the contiguous county regression returns positive coeﬃcients, meaning that
eviction rates were increasing prior to the minimum wage increase. This implies that
the true eﬀect may be larger than the estimates in my main analysis. As a further test,
I interact minimum wage with various indicators of county disadvantage. These
estimates generally suggest the lowest income counties see greater benefits from
increases to the minimum wage than those further up the distribution.
My findings suggest that minimum wages may not be the most eﬀective method of
reducing the prevalence of evictions amongst low-income households. While
statistically significant, minimum wages’ impact on eviction outcomes is quantitatively
small: increasing minimum wage by 1% reduces eviction filings by 1.24 per 10,000
renter households, whereas the average amongst contiguous counties is 153 filings per
10,000. There are a number of reasons why the eﬀect may be modest. Low-income
households may have no employed members, or have minimum-wage workers who work
only a few hours per week, meaning they see no or little benefit from higher wages.
Minimum wage increases also tend to be small, especially in comparison to large
recurrent expenses such as rent. As a result, increases may have limited impact on
whether households enter arrears, and thus on evictions.
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Poor tenants often enter rent arrears following an unexpected bill or reduction in
work or welfare income, against which they have no savings to buﬀer. For this reason,
other policies more acutely targeting low-income households may have a greater impact
on eviction outcomes: for example, the Earned Income Tax Credit could provide a much-
needed liquidity injection to families behind on rent. Various forms of housing assistance,
such as vouchers, are also worthy of investigation for reducing adverse housing outcomes
for renters. The possibility for individual-level analysis using the Eviction Lab opens up
avenues for more nuanced and robust analysis into these policies in the future.
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the current state
of the literature on evictions and minimum wages, with a particular focus on the
methodological debate surrounding adequate controls for geographic heterogeneity.
Chapter 3 explains the Eviction Lab dataset in greater detail and discusses potential
shortfalls in its construction. It also describes the source of the US minimum wage and
employment data, and how contiguous counties were identified. Chapter 4 outlines the
econometric methodology used in my analysis, including potential issues with my
estimates. Results from these regressions are discussed in Chapter 5 along with various
robustness checks. Finally, Chapter 6 summarises the key findings and makes
recommendations for future research into evictions.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Evictions
2.1.1 Why evictions?
Low-income households are more mobile than their level of economic resources would
predict, given the costs associated with moving house. Part of this discrepancy can
be explained by their propensity for renting, rather than owning, property, which is
inherently less stable and has lower transaction costs associated with moving. However,
even amongst renters, the very poor move more frequently than the poor, suggesting
another catalyst is driving this trend (Ihrke & Faber, 2012; US Census Bureau, 2015).
The literature has explored this mobility as both a voluntary and an involuntary
phenomenon. When it comes to voluntary drivers, changes in family composition, new
economic or educational opportunities, and changes in preferences over the life cycle can
influence mobility decisions. This is generally captured by the concept of “locational
attainment”, in which families convert financial capital into housing capital by moving
into better neighbourhoods (DeLuca, Wood, & Rosenblatt, 2019, p. 557). From the
attainment perspective, residential mobility amongst low-income households is desirable
in that it reflects social mobility. However, this may overstate the degree of rationality
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and autonomy poorer renters exercise over their housing choices, with ethnographic
studies finding that they tend to move suddenly following an unexpected event (DeLuca
et al., 2019; Desmond, 2016). Poor households tend to source new accommodation
quickly through social networks, rather than through more systematic search methods
(Skobba & Goetz, 2013). Recent evidence suggests poor households would like to move
out of their disadvantaged neighbourhoods, but face financial and informational barriers
in the housing search that prevent them from doing so (Bergman et al., 2019).
Related to attainment is the idea of moving for employment or education. It is
possible that poorer households, who have lower opportunity costs than their wealthier
peers, relocate more readily in pursuit of work or school opportunities for themselves
or their children. However, this hypothesis finds little support in the data. Those
below the poverty line tend to move shorter distances, which is inconsistent with
chasing job oﬀers, as commuting would be a viable alternative for these already
financially-constrained households (Stoll, 2013). In addition, they are less likely to
report employment, as opposed to family or housing issues, as the cause of their move
(Gillespie, 2017). Given the severe resource constraints of low-income renters, it is also
unlikely that their mobility reflects a desire to enter more desirable school catchment
zones for their children. Poorer households generally do not move to better
neighbourhoods (Coulton, Theodos, & Turner, 2012; Stoll, 2013), nor do they cite
issues with the quality of their previous neighbourhood as the reason for their move
(Skobba & Goetz, 2013).
There is thus little evidence that disadvantaged households’ mobility reflects
improving socio-economic status, but what about the reverse? As a price mechanism,
rents may act to sort struggling renters into lower quality, but cheaper, areas
(Desmond & Shollenberger, 2015). However, most low-income households experience
no change, or even increases, in rent after moving, contradicting this market
equilibrium approach. This would suggest that low-income households are not willingly
moving to neighbourhoods whose costs and characteristics better reflect their level of
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economic resources. Instead, it may be that housing mobility is a quadratic function of
income. Only households above some critical income threshold have the resources
necessary to conduct a proper search and voluntarily relocate to more desirable
neighbourhoods, while middle-income families can aﬀord to maintain their residence,
but not to upgrade it. Poor households, in contrast, have higher mobility because they
are “priced out of staying” (Desmond & Shollenberger, 2015, p. 1754).
This then shifts attention to why the poorest households may be involuntarily mobile.
The most commonly proﬀered explanation is gentrification, in which wealthier and better
educated people monopolise previously disadvantaged communities. This can displace
the urban poor, in particular, through increasing rents and neighbourhood price levels,
with some evidence of significant eﬀects (Martin & Beck, 2016; Tach & Emory, 2017).
However, other studies find that gentrification’s contribution to forced displacement is
limited or non-significant (Desmond & Gershenson, 2017; Dragan, Ellen, & Glied, 2019;
Raymond, Duckworth, Miller, Lucas, & Pokharel, 2016; Shelton, 2018).1 These mixed
results may be due to the long-term nature of the process; attempts by poor renters
to remain in the gentrifying area to take advantage of its improving amenities (Dragan
et al., 2019; Ellen & O’Regan, 2011); or the tendency for gentrification to occur in
only certain low-income areas. Areas that gentrify are typically adjacent to well-oﬀ
neighbourhoods and working class, rather than impoverished; high-poverty areas are
avoided due to their reputation for crime and disorder (Guerrieri, Hartley, & Hurst,
2013; Hwang & Sampson, 2014; Richardson, Mitchell, & Franco, 2019). This would
suggest gentrification does not occur often enough in severely disadvantaged areas to
explain their observed rates of mobility.
Thus, it appears that the phenomenon is not due to broader economic forces. That
is, low-income renters are not being enticed into higher or lower quality neighbourhoods
by better opportunities or cheaper prices, respectively, nor are they being forced out by
increasing rents as a result of their current community improving. The catalyst must
1See Zuk et al. (2015) for a full review of the gentrification literature.
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therefore be at the micro-level between individual households and their landlords.
Landlords may not be choosing to remove their tenants: foreclosures or
condemnations by housing authorities can force renters to vacate the property against
both their and the landlord’s will. Foreclosures of investment properties garnered
attention following the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US in 2007-10, with data
showing that 10-20% of foreclosed properties were renter-occupied (Carter, Pelletiere,
Raman, & Cresce, 2014). These foreclosures were often concentrated in low-income
communities, and appear to have disproportionately aﬀected Hispanic renters
(Desmond & Shollenberger, 2015; Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2008). They also
may help explain the sudden jump in renter mobility during the GFC, disrupting the
trend decline (Ihrke, 2017). Survey data show that foreclosures constitute one-fifth to
one-quarter of forced moves for renters (Desmond & Gershenson, 2016; Desmond,
Gershenson, & Kiviat, 2015), making them a primary contributor to low-income
mobility.
Empirical studies on the impact of unsafe housing demolition on poor renters are
limited.2 Studies generally find housing condemnations constitute 5-7% of low-income
households’ forced removals (Desmond & Gershenson, 2016; Desmond & Shollenberger,
2015; Desmond et al., 2015), though some studies report much higher estimates (DeLuca
et al., 2019). Highly disadvantaged renters often occupy properties with severe code
violations, so housing demolitions may partly explain the phenomenon (DeLuca et al.,
2019; Desmond, 2016; Desmond & Shollenberger, 2015). However, it is unlikely that
they can account for the scale of the issue.
Until recently, landlords voluntarily evicting tenants received little attention in the
literature on low-income residential mobility.3 Ground-breaking field work by Desmond
(2012) revealed evictions to be commonplace in the lives of America’s poor, and in the
2Scholarship on housing demolition tends to focus on the removal of public housing projects; see, for
example, Goetz (2011). However, most poor renters are in the private rental market (Desmond, 2016),
suggesting public housing demolition is not a primary driver of forced moves.
3See Desmond (2012) and Hartman and Robinson (2003) for reflections on this oversight.
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years since, researchers have acknowledged their pivotal role in poor renters’ mobility
(DeLuca et al., 2019; Desmond & Gershenson, 2016, 2017; Desmond & Shollenberger,
2015). The primary reason for evictions is rent arrears, resulting in a forced move that
only adds to the financial distress experienced by low-income households (Desmond et
al., 2013); for this reason, evictions have been described as central to “the reproduction
of urban poverty” (Desmond, 2012, p. 122). The remainder of this literature review will
focus on quantifying the prevalence of eviction, contextualising it within the broader
institutional setting, and briefly discussing the consequences for those aﬀected.
2.1.2 Prevalence of evictions
Before the establishment of the Eviction Lab, estimates of the prevalence of
evictions in the US relied primarily on city case studies, using a combination of
qualitative and quantitative methods. Qualitative data is collected through in-depth
interviews or ethnographic fieldwork with evictees (Burgard, Seefeldt, & Zelner, 2012;
DeLuca et al., 2019; Desmond, 2016), landlords or property managers (Desmond, 2016;
Garboden & Rosen, 2019), or eviction squads (Desmond, 2016; Purser, 2014); or
observational work in housing courts (Collinson & Reed, 2018; Desmond, 2016; Purser,
2014). Quantitative estimates generally use court or administrative records or surveys
(DeLuca et al., 2019; Desmond & Gershenson, 2016, 2017; Desmond & Shollenberger,
2015).
Depending on data availability and the chosen methodology, studies variably focus
on formal evictions, filings of eviction applications by landlords, or informal evictions.
While procedural filings and formal evictions leave a paper trail, informal evictions – in
which landlords force tenants to leave the property,4 or tenants pre-emptively vacate the
property after being threatened with eviction – are more diﬃcult to measure. Desmond
et al. (2015)’s analysis of the Milwaukee Area Renters Study revealed almost half of all
forced moves in 2009-11 were informal evictions. Therefore, estimates of formal evictions
4For example, by removing a tenant’s front door, or moving new tenants in before they have vacated
(Desmond, 2016).
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or filings can be thought of as lower bounds for the true prevalence of evictions.
In this respect, surveys and interviews are a useful way of supplementing
administrative data. However, they have their own limitations. When eliciting
information on rental histories, both tenants and landlords may display social
desirability bias – that is, their description of their experiences is influenced by the
presence of the researcher and their perceptions of the research subject. For tenants,
this can mean minimising their own responsibility for the eviction, or portraying the
eviction as a voluntary move due to the social stigma associated with being evicted
(Desmond & Gershenson, 2017). Landlords, on the other hand, may want to avoid
seeming like a “slumlord” (Desmond & Wilmers, 2019, p. 1118), depicting the decision
to terminate the lease as mutual (Garboden & Rosen, 2019). This adds to the
complexity of gathering accurate data on informal evictions’ prevalence.
Since rents, incomes and tenancy laws vary geographically, estimates of evictions’
prevalence vary significantly by locality (Boeing & Waddell, 2016; Hatch, 2017). 22%
of rental households in Atlanta faced formal eviction proceedings in 2015, with
estimates of completed evictions ranging from 5% to 12% (Raymond et al., 2016). In
Milwaukee, an average of 3.5% of renters were evicted annually from 2003-07, though
the rate for high-poverty neighbourhoods was more than twice as high (Desmond,
2012). Evictions are endemic in poor minority communities: restricting attention to
impoverished, predominantly African American areas results in much higher estimates
(DeLuca et al., 2019; Desmond & Shollenberger, 2015; Raymond et al., 2016; Shelton,
2018). Desmond (2012, p. 120) noted that “in poor black neighbourhoods, what
incarceration is to men, eviction is to women.” At the individual level, the recently
unemployed and those with children are more likely to be evicted even after controlling
for other relevant factors (Desmond & Gershenson, 2016, 2017; Greenberg, Gershenson,
& Desmond, 2016).
While it cannot capture informal evictions, the Eviction Lab is the first dataset
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to provide authoritative figures on formal evictions and eviction filings for the entirety
of the US for 2000-16 (Desmond et al., 2018).5 It estimates that there are around two
and a half million eviction applications annually, with almost a million renter households
evicted per year. To put this in perspective, the foreclosure rate amongst US mortgagors
during the foreclosure crisis ranged from 2% to just under 4%; the eviction rate amongst
renters has exceeded 2% for the entirety of the Eviction Lab’s sample period. This
suggests that housing displacement amongst renters is as pressing a public policy issue
as the loss of property amongst foreclosed owner-occupiers during the GFC.
It is evident that evictions play a pivotal role in the lives of the poor. However,
the direction of the causal relationship between socio-economic disadvantage and forced
moves is not immediately clear – namely, is eviction a cause or a consequence of poverty?
2.1.3 Causes of eviction
2.1.3.1 Persistent economic disadvantage
The most common cause of eviction filings is rent arrears (Desmond et al., 2013),
with landlords able to file for dispossession after a legislated delinquency grace period
(Hatch, 2017). There are various reasons why a low-income household may not be
willing or able to pay their rent. On the one hand, there is evidence poor renters may
strategically withhold payments in the hopes of forcing their landlord to conduct repairs,
or in anticipation of an eviction, in which case they would rather use the money for the
security deposit on their next property (Desmond, 2016).
However, more often, households simply cannot make ends meet. Those in poverty
are often unemployed and receiving some fixed government transfer, or employed
tenuously in low-wage occupations with limited hours and benefits. As a result,
low-income households generally live hand-to-mouth and cannot accumulate savings,
precluding self-insurance against negative shocks. In the presence of liquidity
5This dataset is described in more detail in Chapter 3.
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constraints and incomplete markets, this leaves poor households vulnerable to
exogenous income shocks (Jappelli & Pistaferri, 2010), such as reduced work, docked
welfare, or unexpected medical expenses. Constrained households may resort to
non-traditional methods of weathering shocks, including pawning possessions, pay-day
loans and borrowing from relatives, which may exacerbate financial distress in the
long-term, or be only sporadically available (Desmond, 2016). These eﬀects are
compounded by lower average education levels, which entail lower financial literacy and
greater discounting of future benefits, even after controlling for income eﬀects (Lusardi,
Schneider, & Tufano, 2011; Parker, 2015).
This means poor households must constantly juggle competing financial demands and
focus their daily attention on making diﬃcult trade-oﬀs (Shah, Mullainathan, & Shafir,
2012). Desmond (2016) observed how struggling renters alternated between defaulting
on or postponing various bills – rent, utilities, petrol – in order to get by. Studies on
the behavioural eﬀects of poverty suggest that the associated cognitive and emotional
strain can undermine poor households’ ability to make optimal decisions, creating a self-
fulfilling cycle of disadvantage (Gennetian & Shafir, 2015; Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir,
& Zhao, 2013). Those in poverty operate under a scarcity mindset and employ the most
temporally-convenient methods to manage their finances (Shah et al., 2012). As a result,
illiquid individuals exhibit a present bias, rather than choosing the best strategy for the
longer term (Haushofer & Fehr, 2014). This manifests amongst poor renters not only
in their daily budgetary decisions, but in their search for housing, which is often short
and unsystematic; this is particularly true following eviction, an emergency scenario in
which households must quickly secure new accommodation or risk homelessness (Skobba
& Goetz, 2013). This can result in low-income individuals signing leases that are no more
aﬀordable than their previous ones, but oﬀer short-term benefits, such as more rooms,
restarting the cycle (Adamkovi & Martonik, 2017; Desmond, 2016). Cumulatively, these
factors increase the probability of an eviction, and hinder the chance of poor families
escaping poverty.
12
2.1.3.2 Aﬀordable rental housing in the US
Adding to the likelihood that disadvantaged renters remain poor is the lack of
aﬀordable housing in the US, which has its roots in the slow growth of bottom incomes
and unfavourable trends in the rental market.6 Rent growth has long outpaced wages
growth (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019a, 2019b), with the bottom quintile’s
income actually shrinking. This is reflected in the proportion of moderately or severely
cost-burdened low-income renters – defined as spending 30-50% or more than 50% of
one’s income on housing, respectively – increasing since 2000 (Larrimore & Schuetz,
2017). The GFC appears to have exacerbated this trend, with housing costs as a share
of income rising for renters but remaining flat for mortgagors since 2008 (Kroll, 2013).
Accordingly, the number of cost-burdened home-owners has declined, while the number
of burdened renters has not (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2019). Colburn and
Allen (2016) found that low-income renters have been less likely to escape a
rent-burdened state since the GFC compared to before; whereas moving homes used to
be an eﬀective strategy for reducing burden, it no longer has any significant eﬀect. Nor
has government assistance filled the gap: only one quarter of renters eligible for
housing assistance actually receive it (Rice & Sard, 2009). As a result, a full-time
worker earning the minimum wage could not aﬀord market rent for a two-bedroom
home in any US state, while they could aﬀord to rent a one-bedroom property in just
twenty-eight of the country’s more than 3,000 counties (National Low Income Housing
Coalition, 2019).
The causes of these trends are ambiguous. While increasing rents can reflect
improvements in the quality of the housing stock, the proportion of rental properties
with severe habitability problems has remained constant for decades (Desmond & Bell,
2015). In addition, Reher (2018) found that quality improvements are concentrated in
the above-median rental market. Higher rents must therefore be reflecting the quantity,
rather than quality, of the rental stock. Although construction of new housing stock
6See Sieg and Yoon (2019) for modelling of the aﬀordable housing market and its frictions.
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has begun to rebound since the GFC, growth in rental units has been concentrated in
higher price ranges, resulting in low vacancy rates in the aﬀordable housing market
segment (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2019). Aﬀordable private rental stock
ranges from 34 to 81 units per 100 extremely low-income renters across counties in the
US (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2017). These ratios declined following the GFC
(Lens, 2017). Furthermore, almost half of all aﬀordable units were built fifty or more
years ago, and are very low quality, but despite being the cheapest properties on the
market, nearly half of their tenants are still rent-burdened (Joint Center for Housing
Studies, 2019).
There is evidence that landlords earn higher profits in impoverished neighbourhoods,
with rent to property value ratios found to be increasing in neighbourhood poverty rates
and percentage of African American residents (Desmond & Wilmers, 2019). This is
likely due to lower costs rather than higher revenues; landlords have larger property
taxes, maintenance costs and mortgages in richer areas. Higher profits should attract
new entrants into the low-income rental market, but this does not appear to be occurring.
In part, this may reflect perceptions that renting in high-poverty communities is risky
and diﬃcult, scaring oﬀ potential investors, and prompting existing landlords to price
this higher risk into their rents (Desmond, 2016; Desmond &Wilmers, 2019; Garboden &
Rosen, 2019). These higher rents then risk creating a cycle of delinquency and eviction,
reinforcing negative perceptions of these communities (Desmond & Wilmers, 2019). The
lack of entrants may also be due to the high cost or infeasibility of new development,
particularly in metropolitan areas (National Low Income Housing Coalition, 2019).
This inelastic supply combined with higher demand from the increasing number of
low-income households puts upwards pressure on rents. This may explain why several
studies have noted that rent distributions in some US cities are highly compressed,
with only around $50 per month separating rents in highly disadvantaged areas from
the city median (Desmond & Shollenberger, 2015; Seymour & Akers, 2019). There is
also some evidence that the rise of institutional investors in the rental market post-
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GFC increased rents, though whether this has had any eﬀect on eviction outcomes is
contested (Garboden & Rosen, 2019; Lambie-Hanson, Li, & Slonkosky, 2019; Raymond
et al., 2016). Regardless of the drivers of the disconnect between rent and housing
or neighbourhood quality, the paucity of aﬀordable housing in the US means many
low-income renters’ only choice is between a cycle of rent delinquency and eviction, or
homelessness.
2.1.3.3 Legal context
The formal eviction process usually begins with a landlord giving a tenant written
notice of their intention to evict. After a notice is issued, tenants have a specified amount
of time to respond before the landlord can file for a court-ordered eviction; failing to
answer the subsequent summons results in a default judgement in favour of the landlord,
as does failing to appear in court if a hearing is scheduled (Cornell University, n.d.). If
both parties attend court, they can put forth arguments during a summary process to a
judge who either decides the case, or sends them to mediation (Raymond et al., 2016).
The tenant and landlord may also reach a private agreement in the meantime, which
can be formally recognised in court (Krent, Cheun, Higgins, McElwee, & McNicholas,
2015).
How this process plays out in practice, though, is heavily dependent on where it takes
place. With the exception of federal anti-discrimination laws, the majority of tenancy
legislation is passed at the state level, though lower jurisdictions generally regulate areas
such as rent control, zoning, and health and safety (Hatch, 2017). As a result, there is
substantial heterogeneity in the institutional contexts in which evictions take place across
the US. Hatch (2017) categorised states into three separate categories – protectionist,
pro-business and contradictory – based on their private rental market laws, and found
that pro-tenant states were clustered on the West Coast, in the North-East and in the
North-Central. This discrepancy in the leniency of tenant laws may partially explain
diﬀerences in eviction rates across the country.
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Even the decision by the landlord to apply for an eviction is itself highly variable.
In Evicted, Desmond (2016) documented the complex roles race, gender, interpersonal
relationships, and revenge play in decisions to evict some tenants behind on rent, but
not others. One study found that Hispanic renters are much more likely to be informally
evicted if living in white-majority areas, where landlords are usually white, suggesting
discrimination is a significant factor in evictions (Greenberg et al., 2016). These findings
were not replicated for African Americans, potentially because the US’s high degree of
residential segregation means they rarely live in white areas.
More generally, landlords may use the threat of eviction as a behavioural correction
tool, without intending to actually evict, resulting in disproportionately high filing rates
(Garboden & Rosen, 2019; Purser, 2014). Landlords often want to scare their tenants
into paying overdue rent, while avoiding the diﬃculties associated with attending court
or finding a new tenant (Desmond, 2012). Thus, one would expect filing rates to generally
exceed eviction rates, and this is confirmed by Eviction Lab data (Desmond et al., 2018).
For filings that do lead to an actual hearing, tenants rarely attend court, resulting in
default eviction rulings (Desmond, 2012; Raymond et al., 2016). Even so, housing courts
are notoriously overburdened: in 2007, the fifty judges in New York City’s landlord-
tenant courts handled over 300,000 cases (Brescia, 2009). This leads to overcrowding
and long wait times, making the process of fighting the eviction filing costly for low-
income tenants, especially those with caring or work responsibilities. There is evidence
of hallway negotiations between tenants and landlords – and, sometimes, the landlords’
lawyers – that end in agreements disadvantageous to the tenant, who may not fully
understand the legal document they are signing (Brescia, 2009; Krent et al., 2015).
Tenants who end up before the judge often receive only a few minutes of the judge’s
time, leading to cursory judgements that almost always favour the landlord, regardless of
defences put forth, such as habitability arguments (Engler, 2010b; Finger, 2018; Harvey,
2010; Summers, 2019).
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As eviction cases take place in civil court, low-income defendants do not have a legal
right to representation, as they do in criminal cases. As a result, poor tenants often
appear without an advocate before the judge, with representation rates particularly low
amongst women and racial minorities. This only adds to the gendered and racialised
nature of evictions. The rate of representation amongst landlords varies significantly by
locale, but almost always exceeds that of tenants (Brescia, 2009; Engler, 2010b). While
the presence of a lawyer does not seem to impact the landlord’s likelihood of success, it
has a significant impact on the tenant’s (Engler, 2010a). Programs that extend legal aid
to tenants have been eﬀective in preventing evictions and the subsequent use of shelter
services (Abel & Vignola, 2010; Brescia, 2009).
Legal scholars generally acknowledge that housing laws and court procedures
disadvantage tenants, particularly the poor. The varying degrees of tenant protection
laws across the country; landlords’ ability to use the threat of eviction to coerce rent
payment, even in the face of severe habitability issues; the lack of representation for
low-income defendants; and the cursory consideration given by overburdened courts to
individual tenants’ cases, despite the significance of losing one’s home, all contribute to
the eviction epidemic observed in the US.
2.1.4 Consequences of evictions
Evictions are associated with a range of poor outcomes. Being evicted can initiate
a cycle of housing instability: a tarnished tenancy record makes it harder to secure
properties and jeopardises households’ eligibility for housing assistance, forcing them
into lower quality or more expensive housing (Desmond, 2016; Desmond et al., 2015).
African American households appear more likely to move to worse neighbourhoods in
response to an eviction (Desmond & Shollenberger, 2015). This can condemn families
to living in high-poverty neighbourhoods, which has implications for intergenerational
mobility: growing up in disadvantaged areas negatively impacts children’s lifetime
earnings, creating generational deprivation (Chetty & Hendren, 2018; Chetty et al.,
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2016). Children who experience housing insecurity may also be at particular risk for
poor health (Cutts et al., 2011; Sandel et al., 2018). These impacts appear to be
especially salient for minority children, even after controlling for individual, housing
and neighbourhood characteristics (Perkins, 2017). Given that households with
children are more likely to be evicted than those without, the adverse eﬀects on
children’s long-term outcomes is of particular concern.
In addition, evictions directly exacerbate economic disadvantage through increased
risk of job loss, lower earnings and increased reliance on welfare (Collinson & Reed,
2018; Kahlmeter, Bäckman, & Brännström, 2017). There is a bidirectional relationship
between housing and job insecurity – that is, those who lose their job are more likely to
experience an eviction, and those who lose the stability of their home through eviction are
more likely to subsequently lose their job (Desmond & Gershenson, 2016). In quantifying
this “double precarity”, Desmond and Gershenson (2016, p. 47) used propensity score
matching and discrete hazard models to show that eviction had a greater impact on job
loss than job loss did on eviction. For households that are already financially constrained,
losing their homes and their income streams means a spiral further into poverty. The
resulting stress and hardship explains the increased risk of drug use amongst evictees
(Damon et al., 2019), as well as mental health problems and suicide (Burgard et al., 2012;
Collinson & Reed, 2018; Desmond & Kimbro, 2015; Fowler, Gladden, Vagi, Barnes, &
Frazier, 2015; Gertner, Rotter, & Shafer, 2019).7
In summary, the evidence suggests that evictions are both a cause and a consequence
of poverty. Those with limited financial resources are more likely to be evicted from their
rental properties, and those that experience a forced move due to arrears are more likely
to remain or become impoverished. Breaking this cycle is key to improving the lives
of low-income renters. This motivates my interest in the minimum wage for reducing
eviction’s prevalence; in the following section, I review its economic impact, including
its potential for disrupting the poverty cycle.
7See Vásquez-Vera et al. (2017) for a full review of health eﬀects associated with evictions.
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2.2 Minimum wage
2.2.1 Traditional economic outcomes
Despite being much-studied by economists, the economic impact of minimum wages
remains controversial. The competitive labour market model predicts that an increase
to a binding minimum wage will cause unemployment, but the empirical evidence is
mixed. Imperfectly competitive labour market models are better able to explain this
result. For example, under monopsony, higher minimum wages do not lead to significant
unemployment, and may actually increase employment (Azar, Huet-Vaughn, Marinescu,
Taska, & von Wachter, 2019).
Empirical studies generally focus on traditional labour market outcomes, such as
extensive or intensive employment or earnings, using American data. The US is an
obvious choice for studying these eﬀects, as the ability of states to set minimum wages
above the federal minimum creates significant variation in the data, as well as the
opportunity for quasi-experimental research designs.
Meta-analyses by Chletsos and Giotis (2015) and Wolfson and Belman (2016)
concluded that minimum wage increases generally do not cause unemployment, though
subgroups, such as teenagers, may have significant negative employment elasticities.
They also found evidence of publication bias in favour of negative eﬀects in both
international and US-based studies, respectively. A detailed summary of minimum
wage studies is beyond the scope of this literature review. I will instead focus on the
debate over methodologies used to isolate the causal eﬀects of minimum wages.
Employment findings generally diﬀer by methodology: studies using a canonical
two-way fixed eﬀects model typically find significant negative eﬀects, while those using a
border discontinuity approach usually report insignificant estimates (Kuehn, 2014). The
evidence for earnings is more consistent, with estimates generally positive and significant.
This suggests that higher minimum wages may be able to lift the incomes of low-paid
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workers, without causing much disemployment; as such, they may be an eﬀective policy
tool to improve the financial well-being of poor households.
2.2.1.1 Canonical two-way fixed eﬀects models
Two-way fixed eﬀects models have dominated the minimum wage literature since
the transition from time series to panel data (Neumark & Wascher, 1992). The panel
structure allows researchers to control for time-invariant omitted variables associated
with individual units or time periods, and studies have evolved to incorporate
sophisticated econometric techniques, such as diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (Clemens &
Wither, 2019) or triple diﬀerences (Thompson, 2009). These studies typically regress
state- or individual-level employment data on the minimum wage and covariates. They
control for any confounding national shocks that might be correlated with employment
or minimum wages using time fixed eﬀects, and for time-invariant heterogeneity using
state or individual fixed eﬀects.
Implicitly, this approach assumes every untreated state or individual is a suitable
control for those that are treated once fixed eﬀects are accounted for. This assumption
is the source of most criticisms of the model, as it could bias estimates if the states
that self-select into higher minimum wages are systematically diﬀerent in ways that are
not captured by the two-way eﬀects (Kuehn, 2014). For example, Allegretto, Dube,
and Reich (2011) showed that teen employment was already declining amongst
treatment states prior to minimum wage increases. More recent canonical models
include geographic time trends, recognising that failing to control for
spatially-heterogeneous trends in low-skilled employment growth can bias estimates
(Addison, Blackburn, & Cotti, 2009; Neumark, Salas, & Wascher, 2014). In doing so,
Neumark et al. (2014) argued that linear time trends are overly restrictive and may be
biased by recessions in the sample period. They claimed that using higher-order
geographic time trends instead restored negative employment elasticities. However,
Allegretto, Dube, Reich, and Zipperer (2017) used a longer sample period to show that
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incorporating polynomial trends reduced employment eﬀects to non-significance, while
leaving earnings estimates unaﬀected, supporting the argument that improper time
controls bias employment elasticities. Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2015) and
Manning (2016) reported similar findings.
Subsequent work by Meer and West (2016) argued that geographic time trends can
attenuate the true eﬀect of minimum wages if the eﬀect of the minimum wage increase
is on employment growth rates, rather than levels. As an alternative, they used a
distributed lag model in first diﬀerences and found minimum wages had a significant
negative impact on job growth. However, their analysis focused on total hospitality
employment at the state level. Replicating the Meer and West (2016) analysis at the
county level and restricting attention only to sub-sectors with a large portion of
minimum wage employees, other studies found insignificant employment eﬀects even
for growth rates (Addison et al., 2015; Dube, 2013).
2.2.1.2 Geographically-matched approach
General concerns about the adequacy of controls for spatial heterogeneity led to the
use of local case studies, pioneered by Card and Krueger (1994), who found no
evidence of minimum wage-induced unemployment. Their key innovation was to
compare outcomes in two geographically proximate areas, such as states, with diﬀerent
treatment assignments; this relies on the premise that adjacent treated and untreated
areas experience similar economic shocks that could otherwise confound results. Dube
et al. (2010) have since extended this analysis to all contiguous county pairs on either
side of a state border in the US. This involved comparing outcomes of a county in a
state that increased its minimum wage, to an untreated county over the border,
thereby controlling for unobserved local shocks. By replicating the local case study
approach with national data, they showed that no single area was driving the results.
Instead, they demonstrated how increasingly geographically-precise controls decrease
the estimated disemployment eﬀects from the minimum wage, suggesting negative
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coeﬃcients in the literature reflect improper controls rather than true eﬀects. Studies
exploiting state or county border discontinuities have since become popular in the
minimum wage literature (e.g. Dube, 2013; Jalali, 2018).
Opponents of this method criticise its incorporation of geographic time trends as
overparameterising and stripping out identifying variation, as it involves a large number
of interaction terms (Neumark et al., 2014). However, proponents have shown that
these models preserve the significance of earnings estimates, allaying fears that a lack of
statistical power explains the non-significant estimate for employment (Addison et al.,
2015; Allegretto et al., 2017; Dube et al., 2010, 2015).
The final criticism of geographically-matched methods regards the legitimacy of
adjacent areas as controls (Neumark et al., 2014). It assumes that contiguous counties
experience similar economic trends, but Addison et al. (2009) cited an example of a
contiguous pair containing a rural county and a coastal tourist haven, which would
naturally be exposed to diﬀerent shocks. Expanding on this, studies have used
synthetic control estimation to show that geographically-proximate areas are not
necessarily appropriate controls (Neumark et al., 2014; Powell, 2017). However,
Allegretto et al. (2017) and Dube and Zipperer (2015) noted methodological errors
that, when corrected, resulted in a preference for contiguous counties as controls. This
finding is also supported by Slichter (2015) using a selection ratio approach.
Contiguous counties are more similar on economic characteristics and experience
similar employment trends pre-minimum wage increase compared to a randomly
selected county (Dube et al., 2015; Slichter, 2015). This validates the use of contiguous
counties as controls.
Traditional two-way fixed eﬀects and border discontinuity models are by no means the
only approaches to estimating the eﬀects of minimum wages, though they are the most
common. For example, Totty (2017) used factor model methods and Cengiz et al. (2019)
analysed the distribution of wages and the associated employment, with both finding
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insignificant employment elasticities. That these alternative methods return similar
estimates to the border discontinuity approach suggests it is better able to identify the
true eﬀect of minimum wage changes compared to the canonical approach. However, the
literature is not unanimous in supporting the contiguous county methodology, and both
sets of results are often reported when examining minimum wages’ impact on economic
outcomes.
2.2.2 Broader socio-economic outcomes
Persistent findings that minimum wages increase low-wage workers’ earnings without
causing significant disemployment indicate they could be an eﬀective tool for improving
their broader socio-economic outcomes. The net gain to low-income households may
reduce budgetary pressures and allow them to build a financial buﬀer against negative
income shocks. Given the cognitive strain associated with poverty discussed above, this
may explain evidence linking minimum wage increases to fewer suicides amongst those
without college degrees (Dow, Godøy, Lowenstein, & Reich, 2019), and slower growth
in suicide rates (Gertner et al., 2019). While a range of other health outcomes have
been studied, a review found they often suﬀered from methodological shortcomings.
There is, however, consistent evidence for a significant reduction in smoking behaviour
post-increase, which may be a manifestation of lower stress (Leigh, Leigh, & Du, 2019).
2.2.2.1 Minimum wage as an anti-poverty measure
A larger income stream may help lift households out of poverty, provided the
minimum wage is suﬃciently targeted at those in need.8 However, it is possible the
minimum wage does not substantially impact those in poverty for several reasons:
households below the poverty line may have no employed members, and thus not
benefit; any employed members might work few hours per week, meaning the total
monetary benefit is limited; increases to the minimum wage are generally small in
8It has been noted that a large number of minimum wage workers are teenagers from well-oﬀ families,
or part-time workers in a dual-income couple (Loprest, Acs, Ratcliﬀe, & Vinopal, 2009; MaCurdy, 2015;
Neumark, 2016).
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magnitude, and thus might not make a palpable diﬀerence to impoverished households’
bottom line; or, finally, higher wages may cause inflation, attenuating any increase in
purchasing power.
Minimum wage hikes appear to increase poor households’ access to traditional credit
channels, reducing their use of predatory services like payday loans (Dettling & Hsu,
2017), and increasing their borrowing and consumption (Aaronson, Agarwal, & French,
2012; Cooper, Luengo-Prado, & Parker, 2019). There is also evidence that these higher
wages reduce recidivism in income-related crime categories, such as theft and drug selling
(Agan & Makowsky, 2018; Yang, 2017). This suggests a palpable loosening of these
households’ budgets. On the other hand, there do appear to be modest price increases
that are more regressive than average consumption taxes, reducing the net gain to low-
wage workers (Cooper et al., 2019; MaCurdy, 2015).
A recent study by Dube (2019) formalised these findings on the anti-poverty eﬀects
of minimum wage. In an extensive review of previous studies on the topic, he found
most failed to properly control for the non-randomness of minimum wage and
pre-existing trends. Testing a number of diﬀerent specifications, he concluded that
higher minimum wages significantly increased incomes in the lower tail of the US
family income distribution, even after accounting for welfare tapering. This translated
into significant reductions in long-run working age poverty rates. Cengiz et al. (2019)
replicated these results for the lower tail of the wage distribution, with Autor,
Manning, and Smith (2016) similarly concluding that minimum wages are eﬀective in
reducing income inequality. Thus, the minimum wage appears to have at least modest
proven success in targeting those in need.
To my knowledge, only one study has linked minimum wages’ impact on the income
distribution directly to rental outcomes in the US. Agarwal, Ambrose, and Diop (2018)
analysed a decade-long national panel dataset of rental delinquency records, with a
particular focus on tenants at the lower end of the rent distribution, who are more likely
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to earn minimum wage. As the dataset lacked individual renter characteristics, they
used zip code-level demographic information from the Census as controls. They found
that higher wages significantly reduced the number of low-income households defaulting
on rent, with the impact peaking two months after the increase. This suggests minimum
wage increases significantly impact workers’ budgets, despite their small magnitude.
However, the study also found evidence that landlords raise rents in response to increased
minimum wages, somewhat diluting the beneficial eﬀects.
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Chapter 3
Data
3.1 The Eviction Lab
This empirical analysis uses county-level data from Princeton University’s Eviction
Lab (Desmond et al., 2018). The Eviction Lab contains data on evictions and eviction
filings in the United States from 2000-2016 at the Census block group level, using 2010
definitions. The information is primarily sourced from professional research services
company LexisNexis Risk Solutions, which collected individual-level court data through
bulk requests, automated online searches and in-person data collection. These data were
also cross-checked by the Eviction Lab authors against state-reported civil court records
where available. They then cleaned and standardised the data, with records anonymised
and aggregated, and duplicates and commercial filings removed. As a result, the Eviction
Lab is the most comprehensive repository of private renter eviction information in the
US to date.1
The key outcome variables are evictions and eviction filings, both as absolute
numbers and as percentages of the county’s renter population. Evictions are defined as
an oﬃcial eviction judgement, while an eviction filing is any eviction request filed
1A detailed report on the Eviction Lab’s methodology is available at https://evictionlab.org/
methods/.
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against a residential tenant. It is possible for a single household to receive multiple
eviction rulings against them – for example, if they remained in the property after the
first notice. However, as a tenant can only be actually evicted from a property once,
the Eviction Lab records a maximum of one eviction per year per residential address.
Eviction filings, on the other hand, allow multiple lodgements against the same address
in a calendar year. Cases were assigned locations based on the geocoded address of the
disputed property; in the few cases where this was infeasible, researchers used spatial
imputation. These problems were generally confined to sub-county-level data
aggregation, and thus do not aﬀect the analysis here.
The authors of the dataset have supplemented it with additional variables at the
county-level. These include geographical information, total population, renter
population, racial composition, poverty rate, median gross rents, median property
values, median incomes, and median gross rent burden as a percentage of income, all
sourced from the US Census Bureau. Rent burden is taken from the American
Community Survey, which records rent and utilities as a percentage of household
income, with the highest category being 50% or more. In addition, I source
county-level unemployment data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2019c).
There is a degree of uncertainty surrounding the precision of some records. County
renter populations were imputed using supplementary sources, as were outcomes for
counties with significant annual fluctuations. Suspected cases of underestimation were
flagged using an indicator variable. The latter issue aﬀects, in particular, New York
state, New Jersey, California, the District of Columbia and some rural areas, where data
coverage is incomplete. Maryland is also noted as having an inflated filing rate, but
underestimated eviction rate due to its specific legal processes. Heat maps in Appendix
Figures A2 and A3 show spatial variation in average eviction and filing rates, respectively.
Information could not be collected on all outcomes for some states. Eviction and
filing figures are available for 77% and 83% of counties in the US, respectively. Notably,
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there is no information on evictions for any counties in Alaska, Arkansas, North Dakota
or South Dakota. Appendix Table A6 summarises missing data for the outcome variables
by state.
Another notable shortcoming of this data is that they are unable to shed light on
informal evictions, which are not captured in administrative records. As such, with all
of these limitations in mind, the dataset can be thought of as a conservative estimate of
the true prevalence of evictions in the US.
3.2 Minimum wage data
Historical annual minimum wages at the federal, state and sub-state level are taken
from Vaghul and Zipperer (2016). The entire time series is used in the calculation of lags
and leads, but only data from 2000-16 are used in the analysis to match the Eviction Lab
panel. It should be noted that the only sub-state wage included in the contiguous county
sample is that of San Francisco, despite other citywide wages having been implemented
since 2004. Furthermore, the minimum wage data were last updated in July 2016, so
any changes in the latter half of the year are not reflected in my minimum wage data.
The main data issues are the applicability of the wages and the timing of changes.
While new minima have come into eﬀect at various times, all annual values reflect
averages of changes over the calendar year. In addition, US minimum wage schedules
are often complex, with diﬀerent rates for the employees of small versus large businesses,
tipped versus untipped workers, and so on; these nuances are ignored here for simplicity,
as are compliance issues.
3.3 Contiguous counties
The empirical strategy I use involves using adjacent counties as controls for one
another. I assign all contiguous county pairs a unique identifier using Allegretto et al.
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(2017)’s replication code.2 In practice, this means that all counties bordering a county
in another state are denoted as a pair, with the exception of counties bordering San
Francisco, which has its own minimum wage and thus forms intra-state contiguous pairs
with its neighbouring Californian counties.
It is important to note that a single county can be in multiple pairs, the econometric
implications of which are addressed in the following chapter. My data consists of 1,181
contiguous county pairs, with outcome and minimum wage data available for 1,160 of
them; of these, 941 have a minimum wage diﬀerential for at least one period in the
sample. A map of the contiguous counties is presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Contiguous county sample
Appendix Table A1 shows descriptive statistics on outcome and explanatory
variables, as well as data availability, for both contiguous and non-contiguous counties.
Previous work by Dube et al. (2010) has found that contiguous counties do not diﬀer
significantly from the average US county in terms of population, density, employment
or average earnings.
2This is available at https://arindube.com/published-articles-and-book-chapters/.
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Chapter 4
Methodology
This thesis aims to contribute to the literature on minimum wages and poverty by
examining their eﬀect on evictions, a form of housing instability often experienced by
poor households. In doing so, it will compare estimates from the two primary
methodological approaches in the minimum wage literature: traditional two-way fixed
eﬀects, and the more recent contiguous counties approach.
4.1 Canonical model
My first specification is a canonical two-way fixed eﬀect model based on those used
by Neumark and Wascher (1992), amongst others. Given the high variance in my data,
I use the natural log of most variables and estimate the following equation:
yit = α+ β lnMWit +X
′
itγ + δi + τt + ϵit (4.1)
where i denotes the county and t the year of the observation, and yit represents the
outcome variable in question: either log evictions, log filings, the eviction rate or the
eviction filing rate. The vector Xit contains the following covariates at the county level:
logs of renter-occupied households, median property value, median income and median
rent; the poverty rate; average rent burden as a percentage of income; and the
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unemployment rate. These variables are included to control for broader economic
conditions and the contribution of other factors, such as gentrification, that may occur
alongside changes to minimum wage. I include county-level fixed eﬀects using δi, which
captures any time-invariant factors that may correlate with minimum wages and
evictions. This is important, given the variability of tenancy laws by state and the
concentration of minimum wage increases in states in the North-East and on the West
Coast (Allegretto et al., 2017; Hatch, 2017). Time fixed eﬀects, τt, remove any
confounding shocks that uniformly impact all counties, such as national economic
cycles.1
Later two-way fixed eﬀects models were adjusted to include regional trends, in
recognition of the potential for spatially diﬀerential shocks or trends (e.g. Neumark
and Wascher (2007)), such as the tendency for Democratic-leaning states to increase
minimum wages (Allegretto et al., 2017). As such, I also estimate the following
equation, incorporating a linear state-level time trend:
yist = α+ β lnMWit +X
′
itγ + δi + φs · t+ τt + ϵist (4.2)
This time trend absorbs any state-specific shocks. For example, individual states’
housing or labour market characteristics other than minimum wage might aﬀect how
eviction rates change over time, and thus confound estimates. As with any panel data,
there will be serial correlation in eviction outcomes, so I cluster my errors at the state
level.
In both of these models, β is the coeﬃcient of interest; depending on the dependent
variable, it represents either the percentage change in evictions or eviction filings, or the
percentage-point change in their corresponding rates, in response to a 1% increase in
minimum wage.2
1Diﬀerent levels of fixed eﬀects and clustering did not significantly impact estimates, so I present
only my preferred specification.
2The percentage-point interpretation for the rates applies to β / 100.
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As discussed earlier, this approach assumes that any untreated county is as good a
control for each treated county as any other, once the fixed eﬀects and state trends are
controlled for. However, there is evidence that geographically-proximate counties are
more similar in economic characteristics than a randomly selected control unit (Dube,
2013; Dube et al., 2010; Slichter, 2015). This is the motivation behind my second
specification.
4.2 Contiguous county model
Border discontinuity approaches exploit the policy discontinuities induced by
arbitrary political borders, such as those between states. This is particularly useful in
the context of minimum wage research in the US, where minimum wages are set by
state legislatures. For my second model specification, I follow Dube et al. (2010) in
applying a border discontinuity approach by estimating the above two-way fixed eﬀect
model using only the sub-sample of contiguous county pairs in my dataset. First, I
estimate a national trend model analogous to the one above, where p denotes that an
individual county may appear in multiple pairs:
yipt = α+ β lnMWit +X
′
itγ + δi + τt + ϵipt (4.3)
The potential for a county to appear multiple times in the dataset means there is the
added issue of error correlation across pairs; to account for this, I cluster these standard
errors at both the state and the border segment level, in line with previous research.
As above, I extend this base model to allow for a geographic time trend. Specifically, I
replicate Specification 4.2 using the contiguous county sub-sample in 4.4 below, before
taking advantage of the richer dataset by incorporating a trend for each unique cross-
border county pair in Specification 4.5:
yipst = α+ β lnMWit +X
′
itγ + δi + φs · t+ τt + ϵipst (4.4)
yipt = α+ β lnMWit +X
′
itγ + δi + φp · t+ τt + ϵipt (4.5)
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This means that the eﬀect of minimum wage on eviction outcomes is estimated
using only within-pair variation. In order to identify β, I require suﬃcient variation in
minimum wages within pairs. Appendix Figure A1 shows there is substantial variation
in pair minimum wage diﬀerentials across the sample period, providing preliminary
evidence that this is not an issue.
It should be noted that the literature is not unanimous its support for this trend
specification: for example, Addison et al. (2015) argued that a synthetic control approach
to time trends is more logical and consistent. However, for ease of comparison with the
traditional two-way fixed eﬀects model, I focus on pair time trends.
Estimating the above specifications using traditional methods would involve the use
of dummies for the year fixed eﬀects and the time trends, significantly reducing the
degrees of freedom available for estimation. As such, I use the user-written Stata
command reghdfe, which allows higher dimensional fixed eﬀects to be transformed out
without the use of costly indicator variables. It applies innovations in graph theory to
a generalised within estimator to transform out the fixed eﬀects (see Correia (2016) for
a full overview). As singleton groups cause the finite sample correction to converge to
one, overstating the precision of estimates, the command also iteratively drops
singletons from the regression. Subsequently, sample size varies slightly depending on
the fixed eﬀects being controlled for (Correia, 2015).
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Chapter 5
Results
5.1 Primary findings
5.1.1 Unweighted regressions
Starting with my two-way fixed eﬀects specification, I find no significant eﬀect of
minimum wages on eviction outcomes. Results for Specification 4.2 with state time
trends are presented below in Table 1; output for Specification 4.1, which uses a common
trend, is available in Appendix Table A2 for comparison. Notably, incorporating state-
level time trends into the canonical model changes both the sign and significance of a
number of the explanatory variables, suggesting estimates are biased in their absence.
Repeating the same two-way fixed eﬀects model with the contiguous county
sub-sample, I find mixed results. The model with national time trends presented in
Table 2 indicates that minimum wage has no discernible eﬀect. Turning to the
controls, eviction events are increasing in county renter population and median
property value, and decreasing in median household income and poverty rate. The
latter result is significant only for eviction rates, but surprising nevertheless.
Table 3 shows estimates for contiguous counties incorporating state, rather than
national, linear time trends. The results are similar, with the exception of poverty
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Table 1: Specification 4.2: two-way fixed eﬀects with linear state time trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log evictions Eviction rate Log eviction filings Eviction filing rate
Log of county MW -0.476 -0.354 -0.232 0.284
(0.311) (0.289) (0.219) (0.607)
Log of renter occupied
households
0.247 -0.548∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.0179
(0.162) (0.166) (0.203) (0.366)
Log of median property
value
-0.00225 0.0718 0.111 0.315
(0.105) (0.0960) (0.0952) (0.216)
Log of median gross rent -0.0670 -0.132 -0.0590 -0.00560
(0.145) (0.137) (0.100) (0.176)
Poverty rate -0.00174 -0.000759 -0.00104 0.00723
(0.00435) (0.00344) (0.00470) (0.00598)
Rent burden as percentage
of household income
-0.00162 0.0000330 0.00335 0.00410
(0.00357) (0.00269) (0.00324) (0.00410)
Log of median household
income
0.0764 -0.103 0.249 -0.300
(0.161) (0.160) (0.155) (0.241)
County unemployment rate 0.00674 0.0197 0.00159 0.0311
(0.0118) (0.0237) (0.00818) (0.0191)
Constant 2.311 7.671∗∗∗ -4.406∗ 1.545
(2.109) (2.280) (2.268) (4.301)
Observations 35,196 41,286 37,819 44,102
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by state.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
rate, which becomes insignificant. Notably, this model finds significant, albeit small,
treatment eﬀects: a 1% increase in minimum wage is associated with a 0.268% decrease
in eviction filings.1
I then refine the trend to the individual pair level. As shown in Table 4, in this
specification there is no significant minimum wage eﬀect. Other explanatory variables’
coeﬃcients are largely unchanged. On the one hand, this could reflect pair-level trends
1Re-estimating with quadratic trends did not change estimates, so I omit these results.
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Table 2: Specification 4.3: contiguous counties with national time trend
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log evictions Eviction rate Log eviction filings Eviction filing rate
Log of county MW -0.181 -0.00576 -0.0434 -0.113
(0.310) (0.325) (0.186) (0.359)
Log of renter occupied
households
0.977∗∗∗ -0.162 1.001∗∗∗ -0.646
(0.336) (0.421) (0.349) (0.751)
Log of median property
value
0.343∗∗ 0.403∗∗ 0.362∗∗ 0.559∗
(0.136) (0.171) (0.136) (0.305)
Log of median gross rent 0.174 0.0821 -0.160 0.0977
(0.251) (0.197) (0.201) (0.276)
Poverty rate -0.0118 -0.0153∗ 0.00444 0.00626
(0.00914) (0.00771) (0.00807) (0.0103)
Rent burden as percentage
of household income
-0.00735 0.00250 -0.00501 -0.00309
(0.00556) (0.00389) (0.00574) (0.0100)
Log of median household
income
-0.706∗∗ -0.622∗∗ -0.00139 -0.323
(0.304) (0.293) (0.346) (0.429)
County unemployment rate -0.00143 -0.0113 -0.000692 -0.00246
(0.00952) (0.00899) (0.00649) (0.0121)
Constant -1.214 4.462 -7.139 4.556
(3.605) (3.705) (4.396) (6.414)
Observations 26,037 30,998 28,688 33,121
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by state and border segment
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
capturing the eﬀect of omitted variables on the relationship between minimum wages
and evictions; if so, the estimates using state-specific time controls would be biased. On
the other hand, the more precise trends involve removing pair-year fixed eﬀects for 1,160
pairs over seventeen years. This may result in over-fitting, removing useful variation.
To reduce the demand on the data, I re-estimate this model with trends at the border,
rather than pair, level; however, as shown in Appendix Table A3, results are largely
unchanged.
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Table 3: Specification 4.4: contiguous counties with linear state time trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log evictions Eviction rate Log eviction filings Eviction filing rate
Log of county MW -0.427 -0.346 -0.268∗∗ -0.168
(0.283) (0.237) (0.119) (0.270)
Log of renter occupied
households
0.350 -0.604 0.792∗∗ -0.331
(0.263) (0.377) (0.327) (0.581)
Log of median property
value
0.328∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.570∗
(0.104) (0.125) (0.118) (0.317)
Log of median gross rent 0.266 0.201 -0.0343 0.177
(0.235) (0.149) (0.212) (0.274)
Poverty rate -0.00602 -0.0114∗ 0.00383 0.00624
(0.00684) (0.00605) (0.00705) (0.00998)
Rent burden as percentage
of household income
-0.00516 0.00372 -0.00246 0.00362
(0.00573) (0.00328) (0.00594) (0.00808)
Log of median household
income
-0.628∗ -0.650∗∗ -0.129 -0.559
(0.314) (0.269) (0.323) (0.392)
County unemployment rate 0.00303 0.000161 0.00225 -0.00226
(0.00841) (0.0102) (0.00638) (0.0116)
Constant 3.038 8.465∗∗∗ -4.012 3.829
(3.022) (2.894) (3.873) (5.807)
Observations 26,037 30,998 28,688 33,121
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by state and border segment.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
5.1.2 Weighted regressions
The results from the unweighted regression suggest that a lack of statistical power
may be behind changes in the coeﬃcient of interest across contiguous county models.
Table 3 suggests that the eﬀects of minimum wage are significant, but small. This may
make it diﬃcult to capture if its magnitude is small relative to the noise present in the
data. Some contiguous counties – such as those in Nevada or Arizona – are geographically
large, meaning they enter the dataset as part of multiple pairs, but have relatively small
populations. This could mean their eviction and eviction filing rates fluctuate more
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Table 4: Specification 4.5: contiguous counties with pair-specific time trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log evictions Eviction rate Log eviction filings Eviction filing rate
Log of county MW -0.380 -0.130 -0.102 0.0591
(0.319) (0.262) (0.141) (0.263)
Log of renter occupied
households
0.678∗∗ -0.541 0.970∗∗∗ -0.564
(0.260) (0.352) (0.277) (0.649)
Log of median property
value
0.390∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗ 0.288∗∗ 0.438
(0.122) (0.151) (0.126) (0.327)
Log of median gross rent 0.0362 0.0377 -0.175 0.151
(0.259) (0.198) (0.205) (0.258)
Poverty rate -0.00632 -0.0114 -0.000484 0.00411
(0.00766) (0.00698) (0.00730) (0.0105)
Rent burden as percentage
of household income
-0.00804 0.00243 -0.00161 0.00000862
(0.00638) (0.00344) (0.00567) (0.00872)
Log of median household
income
-0.465 -0.461∗ -0.0699 -0.329
(0.313) (0.272) (0.337) (0.425)
County unemployment rate -0.00274 -0.0114 0.00158 -0.000739
(0.00983) (0.0116) (0.00600) (0.0120)
Constant -0.627 6.407∗ -5.128 4.641
(3.327) (3.438) (3.147) (5.724)
Observations 26,027 30,996 28,685 33,121
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by state and border segment
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
than populous urban counties, and thus contribute disproportionately to estimates. For
this reason, previous studies often restrict the contiguous sub-sample to border counties
below a certain size as a robustness check (e.g. Dube et al. (2010)).
Following a similar logic, I use county population as an analytic weight to produce
weighted regressions. This is equivalent to multiplying each county-year observation
by the square-root of the county’s population (Gould, 1994). I then re-estimate my
three contiguous county models. The estimates for Specification 4.5 with pair-level time
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trends are shown in Table 5. Estimates for Specifications 4.3 and 4.4 are similar and are
available in Appendix Tables A4 and A5, respectively.
Table 5: Specification 4.5: contiguous counties with pair-specific time trends, weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log evictions Eviction rate Log eviction filings Eviction filing rate
Log of county MW -0.165 -0.421 -0.292∗∗∗ -1.240∗∗
(0.958) (0.484) (0.108) (0.567)
Log of renter occupied
households
-1.798 -3.851∗∗∗ 0.377 -4.446∗∗
(1.538) (0.949) (0.245) (2.064)
Log of median property
value
0.193 0.126 0.166 0.228
(0.275) (0.234) (0.124) (1.490)
Log of median gross rent 1.642 0.639 -0.00793 1.487
(1.122) (0.731) (0.294) (1.744)
Poverty rate -0.0661∗ -0.0605∗∗ 0.00768 0.0372
(0.0379) (0.0282) (0.0100) (0.0687)
Rent burden as percentage
of household income
0.0201 0.0404∗ 0.00505 0.0754
(0.0448) (0.0228) (0.00843) (0.0472)
Log of median household
income
-2.062 0.186 0.171 -0.442
(1.597) (1.217) (0.465) (2.273)
County unemployment rate -0.00323 -0.00746 0.0136 0.00415
(0.0327) (0.0314) (0.00850) (0.0504)
Constant 35.24 35.94∗∗∗ -0.172 45.57∗∗
(22.80) (11.87) (3.591) (22.38)
Observations 26,027 30,996 28,685 33,121
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by state and border segment.
Observations weighted by county population.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Results from my pair trends model, the most saturated model, suggest a 1% increase
in minimum wage leads to a 0.292% decrease in eviction filings, or to a 0.0124 percentage-
point reduction in the eviction filing rate. Relative to the means of these variables,
shown in Appendix Table A1, these impacts are still quantitatively small. However,
most variables are insignificant, suggesting eviction filings are unresponsive to a variety
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of factors once local conditions are controlled for. In addition, magnitude of the point
estimate for minimum wage is larger than most other variables, including median rent
for the eviction filings model. I consistently find that minimum wage has no impact on
actual evictions.
5.2 Robustness checks
I supplement my primary analysis with a series of robustness checks. First, I test
for parallel pre-treatment trends in dependent variables between treated and control
counties. Because of the staggered timing of minimum wage treatments, I use four years
of leads and lags to capture long-term trends in eviction outcomes, in line with previous
studies on employment trends (Allegretto et al., 2017). Table 6 shows the results for
the two-way fixed eﬀects model with state-specific trends. The presence of significant
negative coeﬃcients on some of the lead terms using both this specification, and the
model with only the national time trend (available in Appendix Table A7), shows that
they fail to account for spatial heterogeneity in minimum wage adoption. Specifically,
this suggests that eviction outcomes were declining in the years preceding minimum wage
increases. However, joint F-tests suggest leads are jointly insignificant in this model.
In contrast, this pre-existing trend is not evident when looking at the results for the
contiguous county model with state trends in Table 7.2 This suggests that restricting
attention to only those counties that straddle a state border controls for unobserved
heterogeneity in underlying trends, which would otherwise contaminate estimates in the
full sample two-way fixed eﬀects regression. Refining time trends to the pair level in
Table 8, evictions and eviction filings have significant, positive lead coeﬃcients. This
suggests that evictions and eviction filings are growing four years before a minimum
wage increase. The significance of the coeﬃcients means there is an underlying trend
in these dependent variables that is not being adequately controlled for, even in my
most saturated model; however, given the trend is positive, its eﬀect would likely be
2Joint F-tests confirm their insignificance.
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Table 6: Specification 4.2: two-way fixed eﬀects with linear state time trends, lags & leads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log evictions Eviction rate Log eviction filings Eviction filing rate
Log of county MW 0.102 -0.0764 0.0636 1.209
(0.367) (0.479) (0.238) (1.065)
Lead 1 of county MW -0.0581 0.452 -0.113 -0.0399
(0.365) (0.327) (0.198) (0.745)
Lead 2 of county MW -0.443 -0.312 -0.103 0.0235
(0.310) (0.372) (0.203) (0.573)
Lead 3 of county MW 0.353 0.889 0.188 0.140
(0.613) (0.754) (0.383) (0.697)
Lead 4 of county MW -0.513 -0.789∗ -0.436 -0.814
(0.400) (0.393) (0.345) (0.852)
Lag 1 of county MW 0.0838 0.335 0.0139 0.218
(0.199) (0.282) (0.186) (0.618)
Lag 2 of county MW 0.175 0.0976 0.270 0.778
(0.263) (0.288) (0.218) (0.608)
Lag 3 of county MW 0.300 0.281 0.432∗∗ 0.683
(0.219) (0.332) (0.201) (0.533)
Lag 4 of county MW -0.293 -0.238 -0.226 -0.165
(0.385) (0.493) (0.347) (0.654)
Log of renter occupied
households
0.336 -0.336 0.397 -0.296
(0.292) (0.422) (0.309) (0.553)
Log of median property
value
-0.0324 -0.00122 0.0594 -0.227
(0.119) (0.120) (0.0872) (0.337)
Log of median gross rent -0.0460 -0.0265 -0.139∗ 0.0531
(0.0952) (0.0765) (0.0738) (0.121)
Poverty rate -0.00610 -0.00681 -0.00460 -0.00738
(0.00493) (0.00475) (0.00430) (0.00716)
Rent burden as percentage
of household income
-0.00370 -0.00229 0.000635 0.00394
(0.00349) (0.00254) (0.00215) (0.00304)
Log of median household
income
0.0337 -0.0870 0.0385 -0.518∗∗
(0.152) (0.149) (0.124) (0.247)
County unemployment rate -0.00343 -0.00724 -0.00772 -0.0137
(0.00809) (0.00796) (0.00643) (0.0109)
Constant 2.201 4.586 0.687 9.785
(3.830) (4.717) (3.073) (9.396)
Observations 19,156 22,289 20,464 23,745
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by state.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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to attenuate, rather than amplify, my main estimates. This suggests minimum wage’s
impact on eviction outcomes could be larger than reported in my primary analysis. Joint
F-tests show that the lead coeﬃcients are not jointly significant.
For my second robustness check, I examine whether minimum wage increases have
a greater impact in more disadvantaged counties. I expect that counties with higher
rent burdens or poverty rates or lower median incomes will have a higher proportion of
low-wage workers, and thus see greater benefits from increases to the minimum wage.
To test this, I re-estimate Specification 4.5 with each of these disadvantage measures,
interacting it with minimum wage. The coeﬃcients on these interaction terms show
the additional impact above the average eﬀect of the minimum wage, for the respective
variable.
Starting with rent burden, I try two separate specifications. I initially interact rent
burden itself with minimum wage and find no significant additional impacts of higher
burdens, as shown in Appendix Table A8. However, the highest rent burden category
in the American Community Survey is 50%, creating an artificial upper bound on an
otherwise continuous variable. To avoid this biasing estimates, I construct an indicator
variable for moderate to severe rent burden, defined as spending more than 30% of
household income on rent, in line with Census definitions (Eggers & Moumen, 2010).3
Rerunning my interaction analysis in Appendix Table A9, I again find no additional
impact amongst counties with moderate to severe rent burden, relative to those without.
This may mean that my main estimates do not capture causal eﬀects, as evictions in
counties with the highest rent burdens on average do not appear more sensitive to changes
in minimum wage. However, it should be noted that my rent burden variable includes
both rent and utilities, meaning it actually measures total housing burden for renters.
Interacting minimum wage with the county’s poverty rate in Table 9, I find a positive
coeﬃcient for evictions. This suggests that minimum wage increases are less eﬀective
3Focusing on severe rent burden only – defined as 50% or more of income spent in rent – would have
resulted in a coeﬃcient based on only 14 observations.
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Table 7: Specification 4.4: contiguous counties with linear state time trends, lags & leads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log evictions Eviction rate Log eviction filings Eviction filing rate
Log of county MW -0.123 -0.0116 -0.132 0.00869
(0.203) (0.229) (0.135) (0.335)
Lead 1 of county MW -0.0506 -0.115 0.0679 0.0701
(0.129) (0.115) (0.116) (0.326)
Lead 2 of county MW -0.454 -0.184 -0.160 -0.152
(0.297) (0.191) (0.160) (0.243)
Lead 3 of county MW -0.234 0.107 -0.0219 0.0452
(0.145) (0.121) (0.135) (0.180)
Lead 4 of county MW 0.270 0.0535 0.0838 0.117
(0.173) (0.197) (0.177) (0.311)
Lag 1 of county MW 0.294∗ 0.0842 -0.00430 -0.169
(0.152) (0.131) (0.0853) (0.264)
Lag 2 of county MW -0.122 -0.257 0.0820 -0.116
(0.171) (0.183) (0.170) (0.313)
Lag 3 of county MW -0.0111 0.0471 0.0343 0.272∗∗∗
(0.0702) (0.0844) (0.0676) (0.0942)
Lag 4 of county MW -0.313∗∗ -0.231 -0.0997 0.0160
(0.134) (0.140) (0.136) (0.261)
Log of renter occupied
households
0.470 -0.567 1.050∗∗ -0.765
(0.349) (0.516) (0.460) (1.040)
Log of median property
value
0.498∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.340
(0.146) (0.146) (0.139) (0.337)
Log of median gross rent 0.0488 0.124 -0.179 0.339
(0.240) (0.202) (0.195) (0.270)
Poverty rate -0.00617 -0.0106 0.00575 0.00552
(0.00804) (0.00724) (0.00838) (0.0122)
Rent burden as percentage
of household income
-0.00370 0.00149 -0.00353 0.000453
(0.00699) (0.00469) (0.00671) (0.00696)
Log of median household
income
-0.593∗ -0.693∗∗∗ -0.0694 -0.292
(0.312) (0.238) (0.334) (0.419)
County unemployment rate 0.00873 0.00410 0.00778 -0.00234
(0.00842) (0.0116) (0.00623) (0.0135)
Constant 1.599 7.543∗ -7.431 5.785
(3.859) (4.019) (5.070) (9.118)
Observations 20541 24235 22636 25886
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by state and border segment.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Specification 4.5: contiguous counties with pair-specific time trends, lags & leads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log evictions Eviction rate Log eviction filings Eviction filing rate
Log of county MW -0.0498 0.0646 -0.174 -0.0870
(0.209) (0.214) (0.124) (0.301)
Lead 1 of county MW -0.147 -0.193 0.00565 -0.00690
(0.138) (0.137) (0.1000) (0.368)
Lead 2 of county MW -0.443 -0.166 -0.161 -0.196
(0.307) (0.190) (0.163) (0.255)
Lead 3 of county MW -0.200 0.156 0.0301 0.152
(0.147) (0.135) (0.142) (0.193)
Lead 4 of county MW 0.399∗∗ 0.178 0.283∗ 0.238
(0.164) (0.206) (0.163) (0.319)
Lag 1 of county MW 0.274 0.0808 0.000189 -0.138
(0.163) (0.141) (0.0914) (0.295)
Lag 2 of county MW -0.139 -0.215 0.0379 -0.169
(0.181) (0.188) (0.173) (0.318)
Lag 3 of county MW -0.0235 0.0344 0.0133 0.208∗
(0.0753) (0.0951) (0.0758) (0.117)
Lag 4 of county MW -0.238 -0.191 -0.119 -0.0177
(0.162) (0.163) (0.143) (0.235)
Log of renter occupied
households
0.812∗ -0.489 1.080∗∗∗ -1.114
(0.419) (0.524) (0.396) (1.020)
Log of median property
value
0.635∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.256
(0.159) (0.212) (0.131) (0.361)
Log of median gross rent -0.175 -0.148 -0.340∗ 0.169
(0.269) (0.264) (0.197) (0.265)
Poverty rate -0.00528 -0.00839 0.00130 0.00428
(0.00849) (0.00824) (0.00911) (0.0137)
Rent burden as percentage
of household income
-0.00711 0.00204 -0.000913 0.000682
(0.00735) (0.00516) (0.00696) (0.00706)
Log of median household
income
-0.493 -0.481∗ 0.0291 -0.0540
(0.321) (0.247) (0.360) (0.459)
County unemployment rate 0.00501 -0.0114 0.00829 -0.00797
(0.0106) (0.0137) (0.00642) (0.0134)
Constant -2.678 4.828 -7.108 8.342
(4.634) (5.055) (4.508) (9.056)
Observations 20529 24232 22631 25883
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by state and border segment.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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in areas with higher poverty rates, relative to the average. This unexpected result may
reflect impoverished areas having very low employment rates, meaning residents are not
able to benefit from higher minimum wages.
Table 9: Specification 4.5: contiguous counties with pair-specific time trends, poverty
interaction, weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log evictions Eviction rate Log eviction filings Eviction filing rate
Log of county MW -0.871 -1.040 -0.409∗∗ -0.451
(1.235) (0.674) (0.195) (1.413)
Log of county MW ×
Poverty rate
0.0625∗ 0.0551 0.0105 -0.0705
(0.0350) (0.0371) (0.0138) (0.131)
Log of renter occupied
households
-1.588 -3.667∗∗∗ 0.412 -4.675∗∗
(1.549) (0.984) (0.255) (2.048)
Log of median property
value
0.206 0.130 0.167 0.221
(0.270) (0.228) (0.122) (1.512)
Log of median gross rent 1.402 0.438 -0.0475 1.733
(0.992) (0.690) (0.292) (1.575)
Poverty rate -0.172∗∗ -0.154∗ -0.00997 0.157
(0.0835) (0.0822) (0.0274) (0.245)
Rent burden as percentage
of household income
0.0219 0.0419∗ 0.00535 0.0738
(0.0438) (0.0214) (0.00832) (0.0465)
Log of median household
income
-1.805 0.411 0.215 -0.720
(1.514) (1.096) (0.445) (2.170)
County unemployment rate -0.00629 -0.00982 0.0131 0.00774
(0.0322) (0.0313) (0.00852) (0.0500)
Constant 32.83 33.88∗∗∗ -0.589 48.13∗∗
(22.56) (11.34) (3.545) (21.98)
Observations 26,027 30,996 28,685 33,121
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by state and border segment.
Observations weighted by county population.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The distribution of median county income may be better able to capture the eﬀects
of minimum wage on low-income households, given it is more likely to reflect a high
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proportion of workers earning low wages than either rent burden or the poverty rate. In
Table 10, minimum wage is interacted with a dummy variable indicating whether the
county’s median household income is in the lowest quartile of all contiguous counties.
These results show that residents of the lowest income counties see a greater reduction in
eviction outcomes, relative to those in counties further up the distribution. As a further
check, I also run a regression interacting each quartile with minimum wage, using the
lowest as the baseline. Results are similar and available in Appendix Table A10.
5.3 Discussion
These findings are interesting for several reasons. First, my models suggest minimum
wage only has a significant impact on eviction filings, never completed evictions. This
could reflect underlying diﬀerences in the data: eviction filings were recorded multiple
times per address, while evictions were only recorded once per address, as a household
could face multiple eviction notices but is only ever evicted from a residence once. As
such, there is more variation in the filings variable: its standard deviation is more than
twice that of evictions. This reflects the diﬀerent intents behind filing versus actually
evicting a tenant. Given low-income renters often alternate between defaulting on rent
and other bills, eviction notices are a way for landlords to scare tenants into prioritising
the payment of rent above other debts (Desmond, 2016; Garboden & Rosen, 2019;
Immergluck, Ernsthausen, Earl, & Powell, 2019). My findings may point to renters being
behind on rent less frequently, or by smaller amounts, due to higher wages, resulting in
fewer coercive filings. This is supported by Agarwal et al. (2018) finding that minimum
wages reduced rent delinquency. However, the minimum wage increases may still be too
small to aﬀect longer term aﬀordability, meaning there is no impact on actual evictions.
Second, the impact on filings is small relative to their magnitude. My weighted
model with pair trends suggests minimum wage is associated with a reduction in the
filing rate of 0.0124 percentage points, or 1.24 fewer filings per 10,000 tenants. While
no other studies have examined minimum wage eﬀects using Eviction Lab data, Zewde,
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Table 10: Specification 4.5: contiguous counties with pair-specific time trends, lowest quartile
income interaction, weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log evictions Eviction rate Log eviction filings Eviction filing rate
Log of county MW -0.161 -0.379 -0.275∗∗ -1.167∗∗
(0.939) (0.484) (0.108) (0.571)
Lowest quartile × Log of
county MW
-0.0198 -0.177∗∗ -0.0725∗∗ -0.303
(0.102) (0.0712) (0.0322) (0.183)
Log of renter occupied
households
-1.796 -3.832∗∗∗ 0.381 -4.416∗∗
(1.544) (0.944) (0.246) (2.071)
Log of median property
value
0.200 0.191 0.192 0.335
(0.256) (0.245) (0.122) (1.488)
Log of median gross rent 1.635 0.584 -0.0322 1.400
(1.134) (0.707) (0.284) (1.738)
Poverty rate -0.0653 -0.0536∗ 0.0106 0.0482
(0.0400) (0.0276) (0.0104) (0.0728)
Rent burden as percentage
of household income
0.0201 0.0407∗ 0.00502 0.0757
(0.0448) (0.0218) (0.00825) (0.0467)
Log of median household
income
-2.084 -0.0313 0.0881 -0.839
(1.539) (1.197) (0.466) (2.327)
County unemployment rate -0.00312 -0.00630 0.0141 0.00632
(0.0332) (0.0319) (0.00866) (0.0512)
Constant 35.40 37.54∗∗∗ 0.477 48.62∗∗
(22.23) (11.82) (3.646) (22.01)
Observations 26,027 30,996 28,685 33,121
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by state and border segment.
Observations weighted by county population.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Eliason, Allen, and Gross (2019) found that the expansion of Medicaid to more poor
households in the US reduced completed evictions by 1.15, and filings by 1.59, per 1,000
renter households, respectively. In a similar analysis, Gupta (2018) reported a negative,
but insignificant eﬀect of Medicaid of 0.00254 percentage points for eviction rates. My
two significant coeﬃcients fall in between these two estimates.
This is unsurprising. Medicaid expansion covers poor households against the adverse
financial impact of health issues, both by covering healthcare costs and encouraging them
to seek medical attention early. Given health shocks can inflict large, unanticipated costs
on uninsured households, one would expect access to Medicaid to have a more palpable
eﬀect on renters’ budgets than a change to minimum wage, especially since eviction cycles
are often triggered by a one-oﬀ shock (Desmond, 2016). Minimum wage only benefits the
subset of low-income tenants who are employed. Furthermore, minimum wage increases
are generally quantitatively small, meaning the total impact on a household’s budget
will be modest, especially if they work part-time; as such, the few dollars extra per week
will have limited impact on large routine costs, like rent.
Finally, while most explanatory variables have the expected eﬀect, there are some
notable findings. A county’s median property value is consistently found to be associated
with higher eviction outcomes, though it is insignificant in the most saturated model; this
may be due to landlords being more likely to evict tenants in order to sell or re-let their
property in favourable housing markets. County poverty rate has a significant negative
coeﬃcient in the weighted models, which is surprising. This suggests that eviction rates
are slightly lower in counties where a greater share of the population is below the poverty
threshold. This may reflect landlords in high-poverty areas having a fairly homogeneous
pool of tenants to choose from; therefore, the chance that the next tenant will be more
able to pay rent on time is suﬃciently low that it disincentivises evictions, while not
aﬀecting coercive filings.
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5.4 Potential limitations
The key limitations of these models relates to the incorporation of trends, as discussed
in Chapter 2. These geographically-disparate time trends may not capture confounding
unobserved trends, but instead strip out identifying variation. In particular, there are
concerns that estimating linear trends in sample periods that contain recessions, or other
abnormal economic periods, may result in it absorbing useful variation (Neumark et al.,
2014). There is also the possibility that the trends will absorb part of the treatment
eﬀect if minimum wages aﬀect growth in eviction outcomes, rather than levels (Meer
& West, 2016). While I do not formally test these limitations in my thesis, Allegretto
et al. (2017) examined each criticism in turn and found they did not explain findings of
insignificant employment eﬀects.
Spillovers are another area for concern in border discontinuity studies. My analysis
assumes that people live and work in the same county, which may not be true for those
living in areas along a state border. If a renter lives in county A but is employed in
county B over the state border, which experiences a minimum wage increase, they will
benefit from the higher wages and be at less risk of eviction, despite being in the control
group. The reverse would be true for any worker living in county B but working in
county A. Such spillovers would attenuate my estimate of the eﬀect of minimum wage
on eviction outcomes. Dube et al. (2010) tested for spillovers by comparing changes in
outcome variables in counties along state borders to the state’s interior counties, which
should not experience any spillover eﬀects, and found their influence to be insignificant.
I leave this as an extension for future research into minimum wage and evictions.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis provides preliminary evidence that higher minimum wages positively
impact housing stability for low-income renters. Using a novel dataset, I show that
minimum wage increases reduce eviction filings amongst poor households, though the
eﬀect is small and does not appear to flow-through to actual evictions. This finding
is not unexpected, given minimum wage increases benefit only a subset of low-income
tenants, and have a modest impact on the household budget relative to sizeable costs,
like rent. In a robustness check, I find evidence that minimum wages are more eﬀective
in low-income counties relative to wealthier areas. This suggests a greater impact in
counties that are likely to have a greater proportion of minimum wage workers, lending
credibility to my methodology.
Comparing estimates from two of the primary methodologies in the minimum wage
literature, I show spatial heterogeneity should not be ignored. My estimates show the
importance of controlling for geographically-disparate economic trends at the state level
or lower, though more precise controls place greater demands on the data. Results
also support earlier studies’ use of adjacent counties along state borders as a means of
controlling for unobserved diﬀerences (Dube et al., 2010). My robustness checks highlight
particular concerns regarding pre-existing trends in outcome variables, which two-way
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fixed eﬀects models do not properly account for. In doing so, this thesis contributes to the
ongoing methodological debate in the minimum wage literature by providing additional
evidence in favour of the border discontinuity approach.
While my thesis support other studies’ findings that minimum wages can improve the
financial well-being of poor households (Cengiz et al., 2019; Dube, 2019), their impact
on eviction outcomes is modest. Low-income renters often end up in arrears by one-oﬀ,
unanticipated shocks to their net income that, in the absence of savings, push them
over the edge financially. As such, initiatives that provide more of a substantial buﬀer
against these events may be more eﬀective in improving renters’ housing stability. The
aforementioned studies looking at how Medicaid expansion reduced evictions by covering
poor households’ medical expenses are one such example (Gupta, 2018; Zewde et al.,
2019). Another potential policy is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the protective
eﬀects of which are much-studied in the poverty literature; as a lump-sum payment, it
may be particularly beneficial for renters at risk of entering arrears. Research into
the EITC’s impact on housing stability is limited (see e.g. Pilkauskas and Michelmore
(2019)).
There are many other avenues for future research into the long-neglected area of
housing instability amongst renters. Over the last few decades, housing assistance in the
US has transitioned from public housing to market-based initiatives, such as housing
vouchers. Given that broader level policies such as minimum wages appear to of limited
value when it comes to housing costs, these targeted measures may be necessary to
assist renters. Further research into how diﬀerent types of transfers aﬀect residential
instability amongst poor households is a key priority, especially given recent evidence of
the severity of the consequences of low-quality housing and neighbourhoods on tenants’
socio-economic outcomes (Chetty & Hendren, 2018).
Before the Eviction Lab, eviction data had to be collected by researchers from city or
county administrative records. Now, Eviction Lab data is available for most counties in
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the US, including at the individual-level upon application, allowing for more extensive
research into the triggers and consequences of evictions. In particular, the availability
of individual records will allow for richer controls and the potential for matching with
administrative datasets to study longer term outcomes, as has already been done in
countries such as Sweden (e.g. Berg and Brännström (2018)). Given the importance
of stable housing in enabling social and economic participation, and the centrality of
evictions to the poverty cycle, addressing the eviction crisis should be of interest to
policy-makers and researchers alike.
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Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive statistics by sample
Non-contiguous counties Contiguous counties
Mean SD Min. Max. Mean SD Min. Max.
Evictions 412.69 1,691.84 0.00 47,716 331.53 1,203.43 0.00 25,246
Eviction filings 876.28 3,998.68 0.00 116,433 862.28 4,977.56 0.00 143,753
Evictions rate 1.77 2.10 0.00 24.16 1.53 1.75 0.00 18.59
Eviction filing rate 3.19 5.09 0.00 83.73 2.83 4.76 0.00 118.62
Log of county population 10.25 1.47 4.36 16.12 10.30 1.44 4.20 15.50
Log of renter households 7.98 1.55 3.99 14.40 8.11 1.53 1.61 13.70
Log of median property
value
11.54 0.50 9.53 13.82 11.62 0.49 9.87 13.82
Log of median gross rent 6.35 0.32 5.18 7.60 6.42 0.29 5.33 7.51
Poverty rate 12.47 6.04 0.00 56.92 12.41 5.95 0.00 52.32
Rent burden as percentage
of household income
26.82 4.80 8.10 50.10 27.51 4.68 8.30 50.00
Log of median household
income
10.62 0.27 9.14 11.72 10.66 0.27 9.74 11.72
County unemployment rate 6.33 2.72 1.30 26.30 6.28 2.71 1.10 28.90
Annual county average MW 6.43 1.12 5.15 10.89 6.44 1.14 5.15 12.25
Proportion of sample with
no missing data
0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00
Observations 34,073 40,154
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Table A2: Specification 4.1: two-way fixed eﬀects with national time trend
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log evictions Eviction rate Log eviction filings Eviction filing rate
Log of county MW -0.192 -0.204 0.0260 0.278
(0.284) (0.328) (0.223) (0.622)
Log of renter occupied
households
0.344∗∗ -0.660∗∗∗ 0.355∗ -1.289∗∗
(0.170) (0.191) (0.201) (0.516)
Log of median property
value
-0.105 0.0272 0.0982 0.439
(0.134) (0.137) (0.118) (0.278)
Log of median gross rent 0.0000271 -0.0782 -0.0588 0.0614
(0.169) (0.156) (0.115) (0.230)
Poverty rate -0.00506 -0.00391 -0.0000438 0.00845
(0.00523) (0.00468) (0.00519) (0.00763)
Rent burden as percentage
of household income
-0.00273 -0.00000370 0.00209 0.00336
(0.00361) (0.00272) (0.00329) (0.00430)
Log of median household
income
0.267 0.0918 0.545∗∗∗ 0.198
(0.188) (0.186) (0.182) (0.348)
County unemployment rate 0.00143 0.00799 -0.000686 0.0257
(0.0116) (0.0240) (0.00790) (0.0226)
Constant -0.174 6.508∗∗ -5.464∗∗ 4.764
(1.923) (2.683) (2.685) (3.859)
Observations 35,196 41,286 37,819 44,102
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by state.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A3: Specification 4.4: contiguous counties with border segment time trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log evictions Eviction rate Log eviction filings Eviction filing rate
Log of county MW -0.207 -0.0114 -0.0449 -0.0373
(0.311) (0.311) (0.189) (0.359)
Log of renter occupied
households
0.929∗∗∗ -0.181 0.996∗∗∗ -0.600
(0.338) (0.412) (0.353) (0.749)
Log of median property
value
0.336∗∗ 0.408∗∗ 0.360∗∗ 0.552∗
(0.137) (0.173) (0.137) (0.305)
Log of median gross rent 0.172 0.0655 -0.158 0.101
(0.252) (0.195) (0.201) (0.275)
Poverty rate -0.0107 -0.0145∗ 0.00476 0.00618
(0.00920) (0.00783) (0.00811) (0.0103)
Rent burden as percentage
of household income
-0.00739 0.00223 -0.00489 -0.00314
(0.00558) (0.00391) (0.00572) (0.0100)
Log of median household
income
-0.686∗∗ -0.597∗∗ 0.00489 -0.309
(0.305) (0.295) (0.347) (0.432)
County unemployment rate -0.000999 -0.0111 -0.00114 -0.00342
(0.00942) (0.00888) (0.00649) (0.0120)
Constant -0.899 4.404 -7.152 3.966
(3.559) (3.574) (4.423) (6.401)
Observations 26,037 30,998 28,688 33,121
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by state and border segment
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A4: Specification 2a: contiguous counties with national time trend, weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log evictions Eviction rate Log eviction filings Eviction filing rate
Log of county MW 0.619 0.152 -0.441∗∗∗ -1.978∗∗∗
(1.253) (0.668) (0.125) (0.709)
Log of renter occupied
households
-2.399 -3.853∗∗∗ 0.326 -4.830∗
(2.395) (1.280) (0.309) (2.664)
Log of median property
value
-0.457 -0.169 0.219∗ 0.417
(0.276) (0.222) (0.114) (1.423)
Log of median gross rent 3.436 1.393 -0.254 1.368
(2.226) (1.054) (0.310) (1.594)
Poverty rate -0.0712 -0.0680∗∗ 0.0198 0.0352
(0.0451) (0.0309) (0.0130) (0.0703)
Rent burden as percentage
of household income
0.0434 0.0372 0.00802 0.0401
(0.0580) (0.0334) (0.0113) (0.0528)
Log of median household
income
-3.408 -0.236 0.382 0.185
(2.491) (1.194) (0.533) (2.319)
County unemployment rate 0.00620 -0.00875 0.0202∗ 0.0294
(0.0251) (0.0382) (0.0109) (0.0380)
Constant 49.91 38.16∗∗ -0.887 43.65
(36.21) (14.55) (4.161) (26.64)
Observations 26,037 30,998 28,688 33,121
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by state and border segment.
Observations weighted by county population.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A5: Specification 2b: contiguous counties with linear state time trends, weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log evictions Eviction rate Log eviction filings Eviction filing rate
Log of county MW -0.0830 -0.189 -0.332∗∗∗ -1.166∗
(0.632) (0.394) (0.122) (0.628)
Log of renter occupied
households
-1.943 -3.519∗∗∗ 0.459 -3.634∗
(1.728) (0.940) (0.284) (1.968)
Log of median property
value
0.146 0.0294 0.218∗ 0.439
(0.243) (0.226) (0.118) (1.399)
Log of median gross rent 1.502 0.700 0.00916 1.414
(0.981) (0.621) (0.275) (1.567)
Poverty rate -0.0473 -0.0574∗∗ 0.0182 0.0543
(0.0334) (0.0278) (0.0111) (0.0656)
Rent burden as percentage
of household income
0.0286 0.0341 0.00558 0.0825
(0.0398) (0.0291) (0.00909) (0.0539)
Log of median household
income
-1.513 -0.146 0.202 -0.487
(1.599) (0.992) (0.470) (1.767)
County unemployment rate 0.00142 0.0191 0.0157∗ 0.0158
(0.0367) (0.0283) (0.00932) (0.0428)
Constant 31.68 36.33∗∗∗ -2.197 34.79
(25.96) (11.53) (4.064) (23.36)
Observations 26,037 30,998 28,688 33,121
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by state and border segment.
Observations weighted by county population.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A6: Proportion of non-missing values by state
State Mean Standard deviation N
Alabama
Evictions 0.9438 0.23 1,139
Eviction filings 0.9438 0.23 1,139
Alaska
Evictions 0.0000 0.00 493
Eviction filings 0.5294 0.50 493
Arizona
Evictions 0.6118 0.49 255
Eviction filings 0.6118 0.49 255
Arkansas
Evictions 0.0000 0.00 1,275
Eviction filings 1.0000 0.00 1,275
California
Evictions 0.7586 0.43 986
Eviction filings 0.7586 0.43 986
Colorado
Evictions 0.8281 0.38 1,088
Eviction filings 0.8281 0.38 1,088
Connecticut
Evictions 0.3750 0.49 136
Eviction filings 0.3750 0.49 136
Delaware
Evictions 0.9804 0.14 51
Eviction filings 0.9804 0.14 51
District of Columbia
Evictions 0.4706 0.51 17
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Table A6: Proportion of non-missing values by state
State Mean Standard deviation N
Eviction filings 0.4706 0.51 17
Florida
Evictions 0.8139 0.39 1,139
Eviction filings 0.8139 0.39 1,139
Georgia
Evictions 0.7592 0.43 2,703
Eviction filings 0.7592 0.43 2,703
Hawaii
Evictions 0.5882 0.50 85
Eviction filings 0.5882 0.50 85
Idaho
Evictions 0.9158 0.28 748
Eviction filings 0.9158 0.28 748
Illinois
Evictions 0.9377 0.24 1,734
Eviction filings 0.9377 0.24 1,734
Indiana
Evictions 0.8306 0.38 1,564
Eviction filings 0.8306 0.38 1,564
Iowa
Evictions 0.9483 0.22 1,683
Eviction filings 0.9483 0.22 1,683
Kansas
Evictions 0.9776 0.15 1,785
Eviction filings 0.9776 0.15 1,785
Kentucky
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Table A6: Proportion of non-missing values by state
State Mean Standard deviation N
Evictions 0.8074 0.39 2,040
Eviction filings 0.8074 0.39 2,040
Louisiana
Evictions 0.5211 0.50 1,088
Eviction filings 0.5211 0.50 1,088
Maine
Evictions 0.9007 0.30 272
Eviction filings 0.9007 0.30 272
Maryland
Evictions 0.2206 0.42 408
Eviction filings 0.2206 0.42 408
Massachusetts
Evictions 0.6807 0.47 238
Eviction filings 0.6807 0.47 238
Michigan
Evictions 0.8731 0.33 1,411
Eviction filings 0.8731 0.33 1,411
Minnesota
Evictions 0.7836 0.41 1,479
Eviction filings 0.7836 0.41 1,479
Mississippi
Evictions 0.8293 0.38 1,394
Eviction filings 0.8293 0.38 1,394
Missouri
Evictions 0.9289 0.26 1,955
Eviction filings 0.9289 0.26 1,955
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Table A6: Proportion of non-missing values by state
State Mean Standard deviation N
Montana
Evictions 0.9076 0.29 952
Eviction filings 0.9076 0.29 952
Nebraska
Evictions 0.9197 0.27 1,581
Eviction filings 0.9197 0.27 1,581
Nevada
Evictions 0.8235 0.38 289
Eviction filings 0.8235 0.38 289
New Hampshire
Evictions 0.4647 0.50 170
Eviction filings 0.4647 0.50 170
New Jersey
Evictions 0.9244 0.26 357
Eviction filings 0.9244 0.26 357
New Mexico
Evictions 0.8021 0.40 561
Eviction filings 0.8021 0.40 561
New York
Evictions 0.3529 0.48 1,054
Eviction filings 0.3529 0.48 1,054
North Carolina
Evictions 0.8818 0.32 1,700
Eviction filings 0.8818 0.32 1,700
North Dakota
Evictions 0.0000 0.00 901
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Table A6: Proportion of non-missing values by state
State Mean Standard deviation N
Eviction filings 1.0000 0.00 901
Ohio
Evictions 0.9225 0.27 1,496
Eviction filings 0.9225 0.27 1,496
Oklahoma
Evictions 0.9488 0.22 1,309
Eviction filings 0.9488 0.22 1,309
Oregon
Evictions 0.9477 0.22 612
Eviction filings 0.9477 0.22 612
Pennsylvania
Evictions 0.9851 0.12 1,139
Eviction filings 0.9851 0.12 1,139
Rhode Island
Evictions 0.3529 0.48 85
Eviction filings 0.3529 0.48 85
South Carolina
Evictions 0.4220 0.49 782
Eviction filings 0.4220 0.49 782
South Dakota
Evictions 0.0000 0.00 1,122
Eviction filings 0.3494 0.48 1,122
Tennessee
Evictions 0.7653 0.42 1,615
Eviction filings 0.7653 0.42 1,615
Texas
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Table A6: Proportion of non-missing values by state
State Mean Standard deviation N
Evictions 0.8340 0.37 4,318
Eviction filings 0.8340 0.37 4,318
Utah
Evictions 0.9310 0.25 493
Eviction filings 0.9310 0.25 493
Vermont
Evictions 0.8235 0.38 238
Eviction filings 0.8235 0.38 238
Virginia
Evictions 0.9172 0.28 2,283
Eviction filings 0.9172 0.28 2,283
Washington
Evictions 0.7572 0.43 663
Eviction filings 0.7572 0.43 663
West Virginia
Evictions 0.8246 0.38 935
Eviction filings 0.8246 0.38 935
Wisconsin
Evictions 0.9771 0.15 1,224
Eviction filings 0.9771 0.15 1,224
Wyoming
Evictions 0.6931 0.46 391
Eviction filings 0.6931 0.46 391
Total
Evictions 0.7736 0.42 53,436
Eviction filings 0.8266 0.38 53,436
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Figure A1: Within-pair variation for contiguous county sample
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Table A7: Specification 4.1: two-way fixed eﬀects with national time trend, leads & lags
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log evictions Eviction rate Log eviction filings Eviction filing rate
Log of county MW 0.133 -0.166 -0.0775 0.513
(0.361) (0.392) (0.220) (0.921)
Lead 1 of county MW -0.0695 0.384 -0.257 -0.766
(0.372) (0.397) (0.199) (0.697)
Lead 2 of county MW -0.523∗ -0.492 -0.370∗ -1.021∗
(0.288) (0.375) (0.193) (0.600)
Lead 3 of county MW -0.201 -0.0550 -0.385 -1.787
(0.526) (0.604) (0.501) (1.253)
Lead 4 of county MW 0.860 0.643 0.193 0.396
(0.707) (0.645) (0.560) (0.862)
Lag 1 of county MW 0.0968 0.323 -0.108 -0.315
(0.228) (0.321) (0.166) (0.709)
Lag 2 of county MW 0.203 0.113 0.165 0.450
(0.231) (0.280) (0.188) (0.639)
Lag 3 of county MW 0.252 0.257 0.336 0.486
(0.211) (0.321) (0.201) (0.508)
Lag 4 of county MW -0.161 -0.0768 -0.289 -0.438
(0.350) (0.502) (0.298) (0.633)
Log of renter occupied
households
0.637∗∗ -0.285 0.442 -1.710∗∗
(0.309) (0.384) (0.268) (0.681)
Log of median property
value
-0.00642 -0.0567 0.0170 -0.350
(0.0990) (0.103) (0.104) (0.396)
Log of median gross rent 0.00803 0.0107 -0.114 0.0661
(0.104) (0.0729) (0.0759) (0.123)
Poverty rate -0.00630 -0.00892∗ -0.00617 -0.0159∗
(0.00442) (0.00468) (0.00402) (0.00816)
Rent burden as percentage
of household income
-0.00318 -0.00201 -0.000170 0.00223
(0.00351) (0.00249) (0.00233) (0.00340)
Log of median household
income
0.0381 -0.0914 0.118 -0.229
(0.160) (0.156) (0.136) (0.250)
County unemployment rate 0.00749 0.000840 -0.00864 -0.0558∗∗
(0.00935) (0.00929) (0.00641) (0.0232)
Constant -2.793 3.995 1.457 28.07∗∗∗
(3.527) (4.160) (2.849) (9.247)
Observations 19,156 22,289 20,464 23,745
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by state.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A8: Specification 4.5: contiguous counties with pair-specific time trends, rent burden
interaction, weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log evictions Eviction rate Log eviction filings Eviction filing rate
Log of county MW -1.247 -2.938 -0.259 0.906
(1.670) (2.207) (0.521) (2.930)
Log of county MW × Rent
burden
0.0361 0.0839 -0.00108 -0.0717
(0.0363) (0.0691) (0.0161) (0.0920)
Log of renter occupied
households
-1.802 -3.879∗∗∗ 0.377 -4.431∗∗
(1.539) (0.947) (0.245) (2.074)
Log of median property
value
0.199 0.142 0.166 0.211
(0.276) (0.223) (0.126) (1.483)
Log of median gross rent 1.595 0.561 -0.00665 1.562
(1.115) (0.720) (0.294) (1.714)
Poverty rate -0.0650∗ -0.0583∗∗ 0.00764 0.0347
(0.0377) (0.0270) (0.00999) (0.0675)
Rent burden as percentage
of household income
-0.0432 -0.108 0.00696 0.202
(0.0882) (0.124) (0.0295) (0.180)
Log of median household
income
-1.988 0.331 0.169 -0.591
(1.581) (1.165) (0.458) (2.305)
County unemployment rate -0.00399 -0.00955 0.0137 0.00668
(0.0324) (0.0307) (0.00829) (0.0513)
Constant 36.61 39.42∗∗∗ -0.211 42.95∗
(22.77) (13.39) (3.660) (23.82)
Observations 26,027 30,996 28,685 33,121
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by state and border segment.
Observations weighted by county population.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A9: Specification 4.5: contiguous counties with pair-specific time trends, moderate rent
burden interaction, weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log evictions Eviction rate Log eviction filings Eviction filing rate
Log of county MW -0.182 -0.448 -0.285∗∗ -1.320∗∗
(0.880) (0.457) (0.115) (0.571)
Moderate to severe rent
burden × Log of county
MW
0.0248 0.0385 -0.0107 0.116
(0.125) (0.0807) (0.0173) (0.207)
Log of renter occupied
households
-1.797 -3.851∗∗∗ 0.376 -4.443∗∗
(1.534) (0.957) (0.244) (2.078)
Log of median property
value
0.184 0.112 0.170 0.187
(0.243) (0.246) (0.122) (1.532)
Log of median gross rent 1.613 0.600 0.00397 1.367
(1.146) (0.762) (0.292) (1.665)
Poverty rate -0.0661∗ -0.0606∗∗ 0.00771 0.0369
(0.0378) (0.0282) (0.0100) (0.0688)
Rent burden as percentage
of household income
0.0157 0.0338∗ 0.00694 0.0554
(0.0263) (0.0183) (0.00912) (0.0467)
Log of median household
income
-1.995 0.278 0.144 -0.165
(1.545) (1.259) (0.451) (2.486)
County unemployment rate -0.00320 -0.00748 0.0136 0.00413
(0.0325) (0.0314) (0.00853) (0.0505)
Constant 34.95 35.60∗∗∗ -0.0520 44.48∗∗
(22.09) (12.03) (3.516) (21.93)
Observations 26,027 30,996 28,685 33,121
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by state and border segment.
Observations weighted by county population.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A10: Specification 4.5: contiguous counties with pair-specific time trends, quartile income
interactions, weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log evictions Eviction rate Log eviction filings Eviction filing rate
Log of county MW -0.515 -0.387 -0.310∗∗ -1.441∗∗
(0.736) (0.496) (0.133) (0.668)
Second quartile × Log of
county MW
0.128∗ 0.143∗ 0.0639∗ 0.296
(0.0658) (0.0723) (0.0346) (0.208)
Third quartile × Log of
county MW
0.0278 0.0531 0.0518 0.291
(0.113) (0.116) (0.0459) (0.285)
Fourth quartile × Log of
county MW
0.346 -0.0358 0.0278 0.270
(0.289) (0.208) (0.0653) (0.401)
Log of renter occupied
households
-1.990 -3.820∗∗∗ 0.394 -4.404∗∗
(1.602) (0.944) (0.242) (2.050)
Log of median property
value
0.0491 0.214 0.201∗ 0.343
(0.177) (0.241) (0.116) (1.463)
Log of median gross rent 1.623 0.491 -0.0493 1.390
(1.130) (0.707) (0.271) (1.660)
Poverty rate -0.0629∗ -0.0505∗ 0.0111 0.0485
(0.0355) (0.0280) (0.0103) (0.0732)
Rent burden as percentage
of household income
0.0187 0.0428∗ 0.00543 0.0759
(0.0438) (0.0215) (0.00804) (0.0457)
Log of median household
income
-2.479 0.486 0.185 -0.772
(1.884) (1.342) (0.461) (2.358)
County unemployment rate 0.000266 -0.00735 0.0139 0.00611
(0.0285) (0.0323) (0.00867) (0.0516)
Constant 43.95 32.02∗∗ -0.730 47.72∗∗
(28.83) (13.67) (3.727) (21.86)
Observations 26,027 30,996 28,685 33,121
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by state and border segment.
Observations weighted by county population.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure A2: Spatial variation in average eviction rates (%)
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Figure A3: Spatial variation in average eviction filing rates (%)
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